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The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense
Dan M. Kahan *
and Donald Braman †
Why do certain self-defense cases—ones, e.g., involving battered women who kill
their sleeping abusers, or beleaguered commuters who shoot panhandling minority teens—provoke intense political conflict? The conventional and seemingly
obvious answer is that people judge such cases in a politically partisan fashion.
This paper, however, suggests a subtler and more complex explanation. Social
psychologists have shown that individuals resolve factual ambiguities in a manner supportive of their defining values, both to minimize dissonance and to protect their connection to others who share their commitments. This form of selfdefensive cognition, it is submitted, shapes individuals’ perceptions of violent interactions between parties seen to be complying with or defying contested social
norms. As a result, even individuals who are trying to decide such cases based
on honest and politically impartial assessments of the facts polarize along cultural lines. The paper presents the results of an original empirical study (N =
1,600) that supports this hypothesis. It also explores the normative significance
of this account of the origins of political conflict over self-defense cases and how
such conflict can be mitigated.
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INTRODUCTION
Self-defense cases can be as politically controversial as they are
physically violent. Their conflict-provoking potential is reflected in
two icons: the battered woman who shoots her abusive husband in
the head as he sleeps, and the beleaguered urban commuter who
opens fire on an African-American teenager who solicits him for
cash. 1 Behind these figures, however, stand broad, and continuously
1 The cases, of course, are patterned on real (indeed, in the case of Bernard Goetz,

infamous) ones. See George Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz
and the Law on Trial (1990) (detailing facts and the controversy surrounding case
of Bernard Goetz, beleaguered commuter acquitted of attempted murder of pan-
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expanding, classes of disputed verdicts that variously move competing groups—conservatives and liberals, men and women, whites and
minorities, straights and gays—to decry the partisan bias of the law. 2

handling African-American teens); State v. Norman, 78 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (denying defense to battered woman who killed sleeping husband); State v. Leidholm,
334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983) (permitting defense to be asserted by battered
woman who killed sleeping husband). Scores of commentators have addressed the
relationship between the defense claims asserted by defendants (real and hypothetical) in cases presenting these basic facts. See, e.g., Jody D. Armour, Race IpsaLoquitur: of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 Stan.
L. Rev. 781 (1994); Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making
Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 211, 286-91 (2002);
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 327-33 (1996); Shirley Sagawa, A Hard Case for Feminists:
People v. Goetz, 10 Harv. Women's L.J. 253 (1987). Perhaps the most fascinating
exploration of the parallel structure of the defenses in these two iconic cases is
presented by Mark Kelman, in Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, in Questions of
Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion Across the Disciplines (J. Chandler, A. I.
Davidson and H. Harootunian ed., 1994). As we’ll explain, although we propose a
different solution, the puzzle that Kelman identifies—why do people who clearly
experience different ideological responses to these cases join issue on disputed
facts—furnishes the central motivation for our study.
2 One need only pick up (or click on) the newspaper, for controversial cases. See,

e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Four Women Are Convicted In Attack on Man in Village,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 2007, at B3 (“The trial attracted attention because both sides,
though in opposite ways, framed the case as a bias attack involving lesbians and a
straight man.”); Janine Anderson, Man Guilty in Shooting Death of Teen, Wisconsin
State Journal (Madison, Wisc.), Nov. 14, 2006, at B3 (“The case divided Racine,
with some people saying White was a vigilante. Others thought it was his right to
stand up to crime in his neighborhood. . . . ‘It was a all-white jury. He’s a black
man," [his sister] said. ‘If Adrian was a white man, he wouldn't be in this situation.’ ”); Reva Mceachern, Young, Black, Lesbian . . . and Always on Guard, Star Ledger
(Newark, N.J.), May 14, 2007, at 15 (“By portraying the Newark women, who were
convicted last month of second-degree gang assault, as ‘avowed lesbians’ and a
‘seething Sapphic septet,’ [local newspaper] writers shed light on their own prejudices and made a mockery of men attacking lesbian women.”); Robert McFadden,
Verdict Bares Sharp Feelings on Both Sides, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2000, at A1 (“Strong
and deeply polarized emotions—anger, bitter indignation and stunned disbelief on
one side, and expressions of relief and vindication on the other—rippled across the
metropolitan area last night as politicians, community leaders and ordinary New
Yorkers reacted swiftly to the acquittal of four white police officers in the killing of
an unarmed black immigrant . . . .”); Mistrial Declared in Castration Case, L.A. Times,
Feb. 10, 1995, at B10 (reporting controversial case involving attack on sleeping
husband alleged to have abused wife).
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Contestation of this sort is disheartening. The contours of selfdefense doctrine express the extreme value that the law attaches to
human life and the dedication of the law to protecting the lives of all
citizens regardless of social identity or moral outlook. Recurring political controversy not only confronts us with evidence that individual
juries might sometimes be insufficiently dedicated to these values; it
gives us reason to wonder how sincerely committed to these values
all of us really are. If we are constantly falling into factional dispute
about such decisions—one day applauding a verdict our adversaries
denounce and the next day denouncing what they applaud—then either some large segment of our society is consistently rejecting the principles that inform the law or, more likely, we are all selectively rejecting
them when we find their dictates unappealing. When push literally
and lethally comes to shove, we all give in to the temptation to place
our parochial attachments ahead of the universal values embodied in
the law.
Or do we? Our aim in this paper is to suggest a more subtle and
complex explanation of political conflict over self-defense. The account we propose does in fact acquit jurors, and the rest of us, of the
charge of infidelity to the values embodied in the law. But it does so
at a cost: the exposure of a threat to realization of the law’s ends that
is arguably even more troubling—because less amendable to detection and therefore to correction—than rank parochialism. The source
of political contestation over self-defense, we will argue, are a set of
related constraints on human cognition.
Known as “defensive bias” or “identity-protective cognition,”
one of these constraints refers to the tendency of individuals to form
factual beliefs that affirm their defining values. It’s reassuring to believe that behavior one admires is beneficial to society, and behavior
one finds offensive detrimental; it’s disquieting to contemplate that
the opposite might be true, particularly when such beliefs threaten to
put one at odds with persons whose character one respects and
whose good opinion one covets. For these reasons, it’s natural for
individuals subconsciously to resist evidence that challenges factual
beliefs supportive of their values, particularly when those beliefs are
widely held within groups with which they identify. 3 This dynamic
3 See generally Geoffrey L. Cohen, David K. Sherman, Anthony Bastardi, Lillian Hsu

& Michelle McGoey, Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological
Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility in Negotiation, J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. (forth-

Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense

5

has been shown to be the source of intense political conflict over diverse factual issues, from the causes of global warming to the safety
of guns, from the deterrent effect of the death penalty to the efficacy
of vaccinating young girls for HPV. 4
We contend that the same mechanism generates political controversy over self-defense cases. As the iconic cases of the battered
woman and beleaguered commuter illustrate, deadly confrontations
can interact with contested group norms—ones relating to who
should be afforded respect and deference by whom, and what sorts
of behavior are appropriate for persons occupying different roles.
Where that happens, jurors who decide self-defense cases, and citizens who react to what juries decide, are impelled by a form of psychic
self-defense to form a view of the facts that affirms their groups’ norms.
These citizens aren’t ignoring facts that denigrate their group commitments; rather they are deriving the facts from their commitments. As a
result, citizens end up culturally polarized about the outcomes of
such cases despite their good-faith intentions to judge them in an
nonpartisan fashion.
To support this view, we present the results of an original experimental study. That study, which involved a diverse sample of
some 1,600 Americans, strongly supports the conclusion that political
disputes over self-defense cases arise from self-defensive cognition of
the type we posit.
The obvious question posed by these findings is, What to do?
One answer, of course, would be, Nothing. Perhaps nothing can be
done. More important, perhaps there’s no reason to do anything anyway: since the operation of self-defensive cognition is perfectly consistent with good-faith efforts on the part of decisionmakers to be
coming 2007) [hereinafter “Cohen, et al. Partisan Divide”]; G. L. Cohen, J. Aronson
& C. M. Steele, When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the
Self, 26 Personality & Social Psychol. Bull. 1151 (2000) [hereinafter “Cohen, et al.,
Affirming the Self”]; Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, Selective Use of Heuristic
and Systematic Processing Under Defense Motivation, 23 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull.
84 (1997).
4 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K.

Mertz, Culture and Identity Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk
Perception, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 465 (2007); Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy:
The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 808 (2003); Cultural Cognition Project, Second National Risk and Culture
Study (Sept. 27, 2007), available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017189.
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impartial, perhaps there’s nothing morally problematic about judgments that reflect this influence. The discovery that self-defensive
cognition is at work, it might be thought, dispels the anxiety that political controversy over self-defense cases is anything to fret about.
But we don’t take this position. The contribution that selfdefensive cognition makes to reactions to putative instances of selfdefense, we believe, is a manifestation of another constraint on cognition that interferes with individuals’ power of moral reasoning. Cognitive illiberalism refers to psychological tendency to impute harmful
consequences (or to deny the same) to behavior that offends (or
gratifies) one’s cultural norms. 5 This condition subverts the ends of
persons—we think the vast majority of citizens in American society—who genuinely believe the law should not be used to impose a
cultural orthodoxy, even if the values being forced on others are their
own.
Treating these condition as they afflict judgments in self-defense
cases is no easy task. The effects of self-defensive cognition can’t be
counteracted through admonitions to be “fair minded” and “nonpartisan.” Citizens laboring under the influence of this form of subconscious cognitive motivation already are doing their best to be impartial.
Indeed, moralizing exhortations likely just make things worse.
The phenomena of identity-protective cognition and cognitive illiberalism are related to—and indeed interact in a self-reinforcing way
with—another psychological mechanism known as “naïve realism.” 6
Naïve realism consists in the tendency of persons to recognize the
influence of group values on the factual perceptions of persons with
whom they disagree while being oblivious to the like influence of
their own values on their own beliefs. A deliberative environment in
which citizens admonish their opponents to be “fair and reasonable,”
then, predictably breeds reciprocal, self-righteous charges of “bias”—
thereby magnifying the conviction of culturally aligned groups that
their opposites are either morally bankrupt, profoundly stupid, or
5 See generally, Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 Stan. L. Rev. (forth-

coming 2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=963929.
6 See generally Robert J. Robinson, Dachter Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross,

Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: "Naive Realism" in Intergroup Perception
and Conflict, 68 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 404 (1995).
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both. This common apprehension transforms seemingly “factual”
policy disputes into occasions for illiberal forms of cultural conflict,
making it even more likely that individuals will react with selfdefensive skepticism to views of facts that differ from their own. 7
This dynamic, though, does suggest one modest intervention
that citizens of good faith could take to ameliorate political divisions
over self-defense. It is that they stop decrying the bias of the law when
they see verdicts with which they disagree, and stop accusing their cultural opposites of the same bad-faith for forming impressions of
those verdicts with which they disagree. Instead, they should openly
recognize what is in fact true—that nearly all of us are honestly trying
to be fair, yet we all labor under the constraints of self-defensive cognition. An environment in which citizens of diverse commitments
reacted this way to inevitably disappointing verdicts would itself go a
good way to dissipating the disheartening perception that none of us
is fairly committed to the values embodied in self-defense law. And it
is also a condition of more concrete institutional steps that might be
taken to counteract the influence of self-defensive cognition on the
law.
We will present this account in three parts. By way of background, Part I examines the animating rationale of self-defense doctrine, and its relationship to decisionmakers’ moral and psychological
dispositions. Part II will describe and report the results of the experimental study we conducted to test the hypothesis that selfdefensive cognition pervades the evaluation of controversial instances
of asserted self-defense. And Part III will explain the distinctive nature of the problem this condition presents, and identify steps that
might be taken to counteract it.

I. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We propose to test the claim that political conflict over selfdefense verdicts derives from the psychic stake that individuals have
in forming factual judgments that affirm their group commitments.
To make the nature of this claim more concrete, we start with an
overview of the principles—doctrinal and normative—of selfdefense law and then relate these to models of how group affiliations,

7 See Kahan, supra note 5.
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values, and factual perceptions can interact with one another in the
application of the doctrine.
A. Self-Defense: The Doctrine and Its Precarious Rationale
The standard formulation of self-defense in America law is both
straightforward and concise. In essentially all jurisdictions, a person
who has not otherwise provoked aggression is entitled to resort to
deadly force against another (and hence is protected from criminal
liability for doing so) when she honestly and reasonably believes that
deadly force is necessary to prevent an imminent threat of death or great
bodily harm to himself. 8
What is the rationale of the doctrine? Conventionally, theorists
divide criminal law defenses into “justifications” and “excuses.” The
former protect a person from liability where breaking a law generates
a state of affairs that is more desirable (along some utilitarian or welfarist metric) than would complying with it. The latter protect a person from liability for a crime, regardless of how undesirable the consequences, where that person is nevertheless morally blameless (usually, it is said, as a result of impaired volition). 9
Self-defense doctrine can be rationalized along either of these
lines. The doctrine can be characterized as a “justification,” for example, on the ground that where it reasonably appears a choice must
be made between the lives of an aggressor and a nonagressor the law
prefers survival of the former. 10 Or, if one is averse to taking a position on the relative value of lives, authorizing the use of deadly force
to repel a deadly attack can be defended as promoting a greater number of lives on net—the desired state of affairs, in justification
terms—by furnishing an incentive to aggressively disposed actors not
to engage in deadly attacks in the first place. 11

8 See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 10.4(b) (2d ed. 2003). If the

threat is of some less magnitude, a person may repel it with only with nonlethal
force. See id.
9 See generally J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y 1 (1956-

1957); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite
for Criminal Liability, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 266, 274 75 (1975)
10 See, e.g., George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 857-59 (1978).
11 See, e.g., Glanville Williams, The Theory of Excuses, 1982 Crim. L. Rev. 732, 739.
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Alternatively, if one focuses on the likely volition-impairing impact of the circumstances in which the doctrine permits resort to
deadly force, one can also see self-defense as an “excuse.” On this
account, the “primal impulse of self-preservation” 12 triggered by the
prospect of an impending deadly attack is said to destroy one’s capacity to control the urge to resort to protective violence and to disrupt
reasoned contemplation of alternatives. 13 In the same spirit of forgiving impaired volition, the basis for admitting expert testimony on
Battered Woman Syndrome and like conditions is that the standard
of “reasonableness” used to judge a defender’s beliefs in the need to
resort to force should be sensitive to excusable defects in perception
or will. 14
But it turns out that one can fairly easily recast these excusebased rationales in justification terms. If a person perceives (by virtue
of genuine or imagined exigency) that she faces an act of deadly aggression, then no threatened punishment can possibly deter her from
resorting to deadly self-defense. 15 Because punishment will make the
defender suffer and deplete societal resources to no avail, affording
her a complete defense instead generates a better state of affairs all
things considered. 16
12 State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 13 (N.C. 1989); see also United States v. Peter-

son, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (self-defense is “[h]inged on the exigencies of self-preservation” where the defender believed that “his response was
necessary to save himself” from imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm).
13 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 345 46 (Penguin Classics 1985) (1651) ( “If a

man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against the Law, he
is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. . . . Nature . . . compels him to the fact.”); see also 3 William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England *3-4 (1765-69) (“For the law . . . respects
the passions of the human mind . . . and . . . when external violence is offered . . .
makes it lawful to do himself that immediate justice, to which he is prompted by
nature, and which no prudential motives are strong enough to restrain.”).
14 See, e.g., Kathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident

on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 11 (1986).
15 See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 47 (Dover 1991) (1881) (“[T]he

law cannot prevent [use of deadly force in self-defense] by punishment, because a
threat of death at some future time can never be a sufficiently powerful motive to
make a man choose death now in order to avoid the threat.”).
16 See, e.g., Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II--Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. Rev. 459, 501-02 (1987).
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In virtue of the plasticity of the “justification” and “excuse”
framework, 17 it is more edifying to add to the analysis some consideration of the historical and political context surrounding American
self-defense law. From this perspective, the expansive range of circumstances in which the doctrine does not warrant resort to deadly
force furnish more insight into its rationale than the relatively confined ones in which it does.
The conventional formulation effectively permits the use of
deadly force only to protect one’s life. But one could easily imagine a
doctrine that authorized the use of deadly force when necessary to
protect myriad other interests—property, honor, autonomy, equality,
and the like. This would still be a doctrine of self-defense, moreover,
in any society that understood recognition of a person’s moral agency
to demand respect not just for his bodily integrity but for his dominion over property, his entitlement to social deference, his enjoyment
of individual liberty, and so on.
The conventional formulation also addresses persons in universal terms, supplying a unitary standard that makes no reference to the
social identities of the persons entitled to use deadly force or those
against whom they are entitled to use it. Here too one could easily
imagine things being different. The doctrine, for example, could authorize deadly force to be employed to protect against nondeadly
threats (to the body, property, or status of the defender) when posed
by certain lower types of persons to higher ranking ones. Or it could
deny persons of the lower rank the authority to use deadly force even
to repel deadly threats when posed by persons of the higher rank.
One reason it’s easy to imagine a doctrine of this sort is that in
fact it actually existed for centuries. Tolerance of the use of deadly
force to protect nonvital interests—particularly incidences of status,
such as displays of deference in public space and male dominion over
the sexual lives of wives and daughters—was a conspicuous characteristic of societies guided by honor norms. 18 Historically, feudal and
17 See generally Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84

Colum. L. Rev. 1897 (1984).
18 See generally Richard E. Nisbett & Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South (1996). 19 See generally David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant &

Joanne D. Eisen, The Human Right of Self-Defense, BYU J. Pub. L. (forthcoming
2007).
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sectarian social orders did condition the privilege to use deadly force
on persons’ group identities in a manner reflective of the differential
value of persons of different classes. 19 The law in antebellum American South did, too, denying Blacks the authority to use deadly force
to protect themselves from deadly assaults by whites and affording
whites greater authority to use deadly force against Blacks than
against fellow whites. 20
Contemporary American self-defense doctrine can be understood as embodying a distinctively humanist 21 repudiation of the
moral understandings that inform these alternative honor-or statusprotective self-defense regimes. The self-conscious refusal of contemporary doctrine to license deadly force to protect nonvital affronts, not only to one’s person but even more significantly to prerogatives conspicuously associated with honor and status (e.g., the
seduction of a man’s wife or daughter) expresses the “supreme value
of human life” recognized by “[a]ny civilized system of law.” 22

20 See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham & Anne F. Jacobs, The Law Only as an Enemy:

The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum
Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C.L. Rev. 969, 1029 (1992) (“Despite the unrelenting punishments and beatings that a slave might receive at the hands of an overseer, an owner, or another white, there were only rare instances in which a slave
might claim self-defense in the killing of a white person. Such cases generally involved whites of low socioeconomic background.”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 329 & n.8 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that “[d]uring the colonial
period, black slaves who killed whites in Georgia, regardless of whether in selfdefense or in defense of another, were automatically executed” but that “a person
who willfully murdered a slave was not punished until the second offense, and then
was responsible simply for restitution to the slave owner”) (citing A. Leon Higgenbotham, In the Matter of Color: Race in the American Legal Process (1978)).
21 We do not appeal to any fully theorized conception of this term, but use it only

to signify a basic moral orientation that treats satisfaction of the needs and interests
of human beings as the paramount normative good, and that denies that entitlement of individuals to have their needs and interests satisfied should turn on their
social status or identity or on their adherence to any particular cultural, religious, or
moral orthodoxy.
22 State v. Nodine, 259 P.2d 1056, 1071 (Or. 1953) (holding that deadly force may

not be used to prevent a man from cohabitating and having sexual relations with
the minor daughter of another); see also State v. Clay, 256 S.E.2d 176, 182 (N.C.
1979) (conventional formulation of self-defense “precludes the use of deadly force
to prevent . . . offensive physical contact and in so doing recognizes the premium
we place on human life”).
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Contemporary doctrine, moreover, attaches such value to all
persons’ lives, regardless of their social identity or their adherence to
any orthodox moral code. This humanist commitment is reflected
not only in the formal universality of the language of the doctrine. It
is expressed too by the “objective reasonableness” requirement. In
subjecting the defender’s perceptions to searching ex post review, the
law, remarkably, imposes a duty on the defender to take care not to extinguish the wrongful aggressor’s life needlessly. By refusing to make
the admitted aggressor alone bear the risk of mistake, this feature of
the doctrine expresses the message that even the lives of bad persons
have “extreme value” in the eyes of the law.
This account, it’s true, must confront a variety of widely observed modifications of the doctrine that challenge its humanist pretensions. In some jurisdictions, for example, individuals can resort to
deadly violence not only to repel lethal physical attacks but also to
avert certain crimes, such as “kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible
criminal sexual act[s] or robbery.” 23 In many others, individuals can
use deadly force to repel a deadly attack in a public space even when
they could safely have retreated, 24 and in even more jurisdictions they
can use deadly force to repel a deadly attack within their residence
regardless of the feasibility of escape. 25 Because they seem to permit
resort to deadly force when the alternative is apparently not death but
rather an experience of profound subjugation or humiliation, these
qualifications of the doctrine seem to bear the signature of the older,
honor-based alternative. 26

23 N.Y. Penal Law s 35.15; see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. s 627:4(II)(b)(c) (“unlawful
force against a person present while committing or attempting to commit a burglary,” “kidnapping or a forcible sex offense”); Tex. Penal Code Ann. s 9.32 (“aggravated kidnapping, . . . sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery”). Most jurisdictions, in contrast, permit deadly force to be used
to prevent a felony only if the felony is “forcible and atrocious,” a designation that
requires a factual finding that the felony posed a danger of death or great bodily
harm. See generally LaFave, supra note 8, .§ 10.7(c). Because an individual would be
permitted to use deadly force under for self-defense in such circumstances, this
position affords no special exemption from criminal liability when a person uses
deadly force to prevent a felony. See id.
24 See LaFave, supra note 8, .§ 10.4(f).
25 See id.
26 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 329-30.
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But the law (through those who expound it) is at pains to deny
that this is so. The tolerance of deadly force to avoid certain crimes,
for example, can be defended on the ground that the enumerated offenses present a risk of death sufficiently high in general to justify a
presumption in all cases that deadly force to repel them is necessary
to protect their intended victims’ lives. 27 Dispensing with any duty to
retreat can be attributed to the volition-destroying impact that threatened deadly assaults have on defenders: “detached reflection cannot
be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife,” 28 after all. When
such an assault occurs in the close confines of person’s residence, as
opposed to the public square, both the statistical probability of danger and the reason-disrupting impact of fear converge to justify relieving her of the obligation to retreat. 29
Critical commentators have shown the fragility of the assumptions underlying these rationalizations. 30 But in exactly the way that
hypocrisy pays homage to virtue, the very energy with which those
who expound the law are moved to rationalize away, rather than acknowledge, these departures from the humanist principles of conventional self-defense doctrine is a tribute to the shared professional and
cultural understanding that these principles ought to be normative for
our law.
Of course, rationalizations of these troublesome qualifications of
the conventional doctrine are also an acknowledgement that those
who are governed by contemporary self-defense law have not completely liberated themselves from the sensibilities that guided its
27 See 2 Paul Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 131(d) (1998) (“[E]numerated-

felonies provisions that govern the justification of deadly force . . . commonly list
felonies . . . that by their nature involve the potential for violence to the defendant.”)28 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
29 See, e.g., State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 901, 903-04 (Minn. 1999) (reason-

ing that one has no duty to retreat before using deadly force to prevent a felony in
the home because actor in that situation will invariably experience reasonable sense
of great danger); Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14
J.L. & Econ. 201, 204 (1971) (making same argument).
30 See, e.g., Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal
Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1181, 1217-19 (1994); Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 329-30; Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence,
113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 430-31 (1999).
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honor-based predecessor. We do remain tempted to regard some important dignitary ends (honor, equality, autonomy, and the like) as
worthy of protection even at the expense of the lives of those who
threaten them. We understandably remain tempted to view the lives
of those who threaten those interests as worth less than those of persons who live virtuous lives. And, as individuals who continue to define our identities with reference to certain intensely held group
commitments, we no doubt remain vulnerable, in a way that can be
expected to influence our assessment of self-defense cases, to differentially valuing the lives of those who do and don’t share those affinities. 31
In this sense, the rationale of the contemporary self-defense
doctrine obviously isn’t so much a passive reflection of what contemporary American values are as it is a considered articulation of
what we believe our societal values should be. And in that sense, too,
when we judge the appropriateness of a deadly confrontation between citizens—particularly ones who are behaving in ways that defy
norms integral to our defining group commitments—the doctrine
tests our capacity to live by the best understanding we have of ourselves.
B. Evaluating Self-Defense Evidence: Three Models
Self-defense doctrine, we’ve suggested, constrains not just individuals engaged in violent confrontations but also those who judge
those individuals. In particular, it enjoins the judgers—legal decisionmakers, certainly, but the rest of us, too, to the extent that it rests
on morally sound precepts—to set aside partisan values, particularly
ones born of parochial group attachments, and evaluate the facts
based on humanist criteria that attach supreme value to the life of all
persons, regardless of social identity. That constraining function
makes certain assumptions about how values founded on group
commitments, perceptions of the facts, and judgments about the appropriateness of self-defense relate to one another. We now consider
three simple decisionmaking models—one in which these phenomena interact in the way self-defense doctrine demands, one in which

31 Cf. Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1441-42 (1988) (concluding that such affinities influence disposition of jurors to impose death penalty).
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they clearly don’t, and another in which whether they do or not is
open to significant debate.
1. Neutral Umpire
The first model can be called the “Neutral Umpire” position.
On this account, individuals base their judgments of the appropriateness of lethal self-defense entirely on their perceptions of the facts
that the doctrine, consistent with its rationale, identifies as dispositive. Their parochial moral and cultural commitments play no role in
their appraisals. This is the form of decisionmaking that the doctrine
demands for realization of its humanist aspirations.

Partisan
Values
Result
Fact
Perceptions
Figure 1. Neutral Umpire Model

It’s worth noting that nothing in the Neutral Umpire Model implies that judgments about outcomes in self-defense (or other types
of) cases will or should be uniform across individuals. People will
obviously disagree under this model whenever they differ about what
the facts are. Moreover, it should be perfectly obvious that people of
different backgrounds are likely to disagree about doctrinally relevant
facts (most of which, such as the intentions of the parties, or what
the consequences of refraining from deadly force would have been,
cannot be directly observed) because of the varying impact that diverse experiences have on how they interpret bits and pieces of ambiguous evidence. What matters under the Neutral Umpire Model (or
at least any conception of it that is even minimally susceptible of implementation) is only that individuals base their decisions on their
honest view of the facts, even when that produces outcomes that disappoint their partisan values.
2. Political Partisanship
Next is the “Political Partisanship Model.” This is a decisionmaking style that subverts the doctrine’s aspirations. In it, evaluators
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judge the appropriateness of self-defense based entirely on their partisan values. They approve or disapprove of the use of lethal force
based on group-based commitments that determine both the value
they attach to human life in relative to other nonvital interests and
the comparative value they attach to the lives of particular persons.
They simply ignore the facts that the law deems dispositive if those
facts generate a result that their partisan values disapprove of.
Partisan
Values
Result
Fact
Perceptions
Figure 2. Political Partisanship Model

Diverse groups of commentators perceive this model of deicisionmaking to be endemic. The most prominent version of this position is the “abuse excuse” critique, which takes aim at expert psychiatric testimony in cases involving battered women and other defendants exposed to chronic abuse or social privation. 32 Such testimony,
the critics argue, rests on junk science and, more importantly, is incompatible with the premise of “individual responsibility” that has
historically informed American criminal law. Decisionmakers’ receptivity to such evidence, they maintain, is fueled by a form of “political
correctness” that moves decisionmakers to express support for
members of historically oppressed by excusing their use of violence
against members of groups that have tradionally tormented them. 33
But “forsaking objective law in favor of shared group feelings,” 34
warn the critics, is a dangerous move. “Such group[-]thought once
led white jurors to acquit whites who had killed blacks . . . and to
convict blacks who may or may not have killed whites, whatever the
32 See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, The Abuse Excuse: and Other Cop-outs, Sob stories, and
Evasions of Responsibility (1994); Charles J. Sykes, A Nation of Victims: the Decay of
the American Character (1992); James Q. Wilson, Moral Judgment : Does the
Abuse Excuse Threaten Our Legal System? (1997).
33 See Sykes, supra note 32, at 144-49; Dershowitz, supra note 32, at 3-42.
34 Wilson, supra note 32, at 111.
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evidence. 35 The beleaguered commuter, it is implied, is the unplanned progeny of the battered woman.
Other scholars have critiqued the “abuse excuse” critique in
turn. Styled the “new normativity” by Victoria Nourse, 36 this position denies the premise that criminal law has ever genuinely been
guided by a principle of individual responsibility uninformed by culturally partisan values. Courts and juries historically exonerated—
whether by self-defense, insanity, or provocation—the cuckold who
killed his unfaithful wife or her lover, the father who slew the “ravager” of his unmarried daughter, and the “true man” who stood his
ground rather than flee the site of a deadly altercation. When they did
so, they invariably cited generalizations about conditions that “unseat
reason” and “disable self-control”—ones certainly no more well
grounded in scientific data than the battered woman syndrome. But
much more critical than the wholly unperceivable intensity of exonerated offenders’ passions, New Normativists argue, was the manifest
moral quality of them. Offenders were relieved from liability when
(and only when) their fear, rage, or disgust revealed an appropriate
commitment to goods (honor, patriarchal sovereignty, autonomy)
that they were entitled to enjoy by virtue of their social roles and that
their victims, by virtue of theirs, had no right to deprive them of. 37
35 Id. at 110-11; see also Dershowitz, supra note 32, at 27 (“The tactic of putting the

dead or maimed victim on trial and getting the jury to identify with the defendant
can be dangerous. . . . Everyone loves vigilante justice when the vigilantes are on
‘our side,’ but they hate it when it the vigilantes are on ‘their side.’ ”).
36 Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of Judg-

ment in the Criminal Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1395 (1998).
37 See id. at 1449-53; see also Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion

and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom (2003) (arguing that traditional defenses have
been patterned and applied in ways that reflect dominant gender and race norms);
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 307-11, 327-38, 342-46 (arguing voluntary
manslaughter doctrine, and self-defense, duress, and insanity defenses all evaluate
defendants’ and victims’ characters against background of dominant norms); Carol
S. Steiker, Punishing Hateful Motives: Old Wine in a New Bottle Revives Calls for Prohibition, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1857, 1864-67 (1999) (concluding self-defense, insanity, duress, provocation and necessity doctrine all “turn on some normative evaluation of
the defendant's reasons for acting”); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law
Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331 (1997) (concluding that moral
assessments of motive explain application of Model Penal Code “Extreme Emotional or Mental Disturbance” conception of manslaughter). For a New Normativist critique of the use of “voluntarist” rhetoric in Canadian criminal law, see Ben-
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Growing receptivity to the claim of battered women and like defendants, according to the New Normativists, reflects merely a shift
in the cultural norms that decisionmakers (and the rest of us) use to
appraise the appropriateness of the values expressed in offenders’
emotions. 38 It’s a politically partisan objection to that shift in norms
that explains why abuse-excuse critics see a denigration “individual
responsibility” only in the law’s solicitude to the battered woman, and
not in its historical (and now contested) solicitude toward the cuckold. 39
But as strongly as the New Normativists disagree with abuseexcuse critics, they actually share the critics’ apprehension of the
dominance of the Partisan Values Model of decisionmaking. Whereas
the critics express disappointment over the denigration of the Neutral
Umpire Model, the New Normativists take issue only with the reluctance of those who expound the law (whether from the bench or
from the ivory tower) to admit that the Neutral Umpire Model is and
always has been a fiction. Nourse and others call for a critical “unmasking” of the law—a relentless deconstruction of the “voluntarist”
and “consequentialist” idioms out of which “justification” and “excuse” rationales are constructed—so that the law’s “evaluative” face
can be exposed to plain view. 40 Undistracted by assertions that only
jamin L. Berger, Emotions and the Veil of Voluntarism: The Loss of Judgment in Canadian
Crimianl Law 51 McGill Law Journal 99 (2006).
38 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 346-51.
39 See Nourse, supra note 36, at 1461 (“Enamored by tradition, Wilson fails to see

. . . that law has always exercised judgment, [and] simply has lost the ability to see
that this is what it is doing. . . . Wilson . . . is only willing to judge in one direction,
headed toward the past. If this is common sense, then it is a particular kind-what is
common turns out to be what is well-established and, if this is judgment, then it is
a particular kind. . . .”); see also Dan M. Kahan, Two Liberal Fallacies in the Hate Crimes
Debate, 20 L. & Phil. 175, 192 (2001) (“The only thing that makes the ‘abuse excuse’ epithet resonate is that the identity of the virtuous outlaw has changed as
traditional hierarchical norms have come under attack from new, egalitarian ones:
he used to be the vengeful cuckold; she’s now the battered woman.”); Steiker, supra
note 37, at 1871 (“Wilson's inability to see that his defense of the ‘traditional’ law
of provocation was a kind of ‘abuse excuse’ itself, arose from the uncontroversial
nature of that traditional (partial) excuse. . . . It is only when law reformers seek to
write in new judgments about reasonableness that the evaluative nature of the
criminal law appears prominent and, necessarily, controversial.”).
40 Nourse, supra note 36, at 1461, 1466-67; see also Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note

1, at 373 (“Our primary normative claim in this Article has been that the law would
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one side or the other is being partisan rather than “neutral,” we can
then proceed to debate which partisan values we want to inform the
law—those that would exonerate the battered woman, those that
would acquit the beleaguered commuter, or some other set of understandings entirely. The New Normativity is, at root, deeply hostile to
the humanist rationale that animates conventional self-defense doctrine.
3. Self-Defensive Cognition
In his essay, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, Mark Kelman
presents what is arguably the most elegant and compelling analysis of
the parallels between the iconic battered woman beleaguered commuter cases. 41 Reconstructing the discussion that transpires in a typical law school classroom, Kelman shows how the factual issues each
case presents (the risk of danger posed by the victim; the alleged acuity of insight that each defendant might posses by virtue of his or her
personal experiences; the excusing deformity of perception that each
defendant might be thought to be suffering from by virtue of circumstances not of his or her own choosing; the adequacy and feasibility
of relying on alternative, lawful remedies), as well as the nature of the
probabilistic inferences an observer would have to employ in resolving them, are essentially identical.
The impasse, Kelman notes, is integral to the structure of the
debate. Factual claims that are only “hypothetically falsifiable” can
never “be uncontroversially verified [or] falsified.” 42 Accordingly,
whatever position a person takes on those claims must “reflect distinct social understandings that are doubtless as much about aspiration as interpretations.” 43

be better if, in all instances, it were expressly evaluative.”); cf. Kahan, supra note 39,
at 192 (“progressives should ruthlessly expose the partisan moral judgments that
underlie the doctrines they want to abolish, and defend without embarrassment the
ones that underlie the doctrines they propose instead.”); Steiker, supra note 37,
(“controversy [over which motives the law should approve of should be] brought
to the surface”).
41 See Kelman, supra note 1.
42 Id. at 188.
43 Id.
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Rather than implausibly insist, then, that the positions we favor
reflect correct assessment of the “facts,” we should, Kelman argues,
own up to the normative aspirations that we are relying on. We
should “focus less on the accuracy of the defendants’ factual judgments and more” on what sort of society we are constructing when
we side with one or the other “in situations in which both they, and
we, must inevitably be factually uncertain.” 44 For Kelman himself,
the claim of the beleaguered commuter is less compelling “not because he ‘inaccurately’ assessed risks, . . . but because the consequences of acting as he did, given his perception of risk, [are] so horrible.” 45 When we can’t possibly know how dangerous the targets of
lethal self-defense really are, it is “markedly less acceptable” to tolerate the killing of those who might be “utterly innocent”—mere panhandlers, or perhaps “taunters” or “nonviolent robbers”—than those
“who certainly were not innocent”—battering men who, even if they
did not intend to kill, were “established assaulters.” 46 It “is even
more reprehensible” to tolerate possibly mistaken killings “when the
victims are selected on the bias of their membership in a historically
subordinated racial group.” 47
More striking, though, than Kelman’s response to the parallels in
the iconic cases—an argument that aligns him with Nourse’s New
Normativists—is a puzzle Kelman poses and frets over. Why is the
debate—in his classroom and outside it—framed in factual terms?
He finds this especially perplexing in the case of his left-leaning students, whom he perceives are philosophically disposed toward a
“strong antipositivism” but who nevertheless feel constrained,
probably for strategic reasons, to “fall back on the claim that they

44 Id. at 177.
45 Id. at 186.
46 Id. at 177, 186.
47 Id. at 176, 186. Cass Sunstein advances a similar position in an insightful comment on Kelman’s essay. Sunstein argues that “symphath[y] with the battered
wife’s claim of self defense” and “skepticism about the claim of self-defense in the
subway case” reflects commitment to an “anticaste principle,” which furnishes
reliable moral guidance on “what it is best to do or how it is best to act in the face
of factual uncertainty.” Cass R. Sunstein, On Finding Facts, in Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion Across the Disciplines 197 (J. Chandler, A.
I. Davidson and H. Harootunian ed., 1994).
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have got the cold, brute-facts correct.” 48 Indeed, Kelman surmises
that even those who find his own analysis persuasive are likely to
continue to find themselves impelled to defend their positions with
empirical claims: “We may ultimately trust our normative judgments
more,” he writes “but we are still likely to claim, with unbending support from our political allies, that we are assessing factual judgment,
objective clarity of vision.” 49 Why exactly? Kelman surmises that political advocacy is constrained by an “Enlightenment dogma—that
facts are universal, values particular”—that makes overt appeal to
partisan commitments taboo or suspect. 50
What we are describing as the third model of self-defense decisionmaking—the Self-defensive Cognition position—suggests a different solution to Kelman’s puzzle. Kelman’s leftist students, his own
ideological allies, and everyone else really believe that the “cold, brutefacts” support the outcomes they favor in the battered woman and
beleaguered commuter cases. They don’t think that they are siding one
or another self-defense claimant based on their political ideologies.
Nevertheless, what causes those individuals to find some defendants’
claims factually credible and others’ not is the psychic costs and benefits of such beliefs to persons who hold their defining commitments.
In effect, the impact of values on outcome judgments is mediated
by fact perceptions. That is, instead of directly appraising an instance
of deadly force by applying partisan values that themselves might be
extraneous or even hostile to the humanist principles the doctrine
embodies, decisionmakers’ values indirectly determine their appraisals
by shaping what they perceive doctrinally relevant facts to be.

48 Mark Kelman, A Rejoinder to Cass R. Sunstein, in Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, in Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion Across the Disciplines 202 (J. Chandler, A. I. Davidson and H. Harootunian ed., 1994).
49 Kelman, supra note 1, at 188.
50 Kelman supra note 48, at 202.
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Partisan
Values
Result
Fact
Perceptions
Figure 3. Self-Defensive Cognition Model

This account flows out of three psychological theories. The first
is the culpable control theory of blame attribution. 51 Across persons and
societies, blame attributions have been shown to conform to a relatively uniform template, the elements of which—volition, action,
causation, and harm—inform judgments of the control that a putatively blameworthy agent exerted over an undesirable outcome. But
based on an extensive body of experimental research, the “culpable
control” theory posits that individuals’ perceptions of the elements of
the blame template are guided by affective and moral responses to
facts extraneous to those elements. Facts most likely to generate this
effect relate to the agent’s conformity to social norms generally.
Thus, a person who deviates from widely held community expectations (ones, say, relating to drug use or to sexual behavior) will be
more likely to be perceived as having acted “volitionally” or having
“caused” an undesirable result unrelated to such deviancy (say, a car
accident) than will a person who conforms to those same norms. 52 In
effect, individuals are motivated to conform their perceptions of blamerelevant facts, particularly ones that defy direct observation, to the
their norm-pervaded evaluations of a person’s values and character
more generally.
The second theory is identity-protective cognition. Individuals tend to
process factual information in a manner that reinforces “selfdefinitional beliefs,” including ones tied to their “values [and] social

51 See generally Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 Psych.
Bull. 556 (2000).
52 See id. at 564; Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. Personality & Soc. Psych.

368 (1992).
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identities.” 53 Obviously, values don’t logically depend on beliefs. 54 But
practically speaking, certain beliefs—that virtuous conduct is not
harmful to others or our ourselves; that vicious or base conduct
doesn’t conduce to personal or societal well-being—make it easier to
persist in our values than do their opposites. Because abandoning or
revising his or her values can undermine a person’s sense of integrity,
and thus lower his self-esteem, it is natural for an individual, psychologically speaking, to resist information that challenges beliefs supportive of that person’s values. 55 This dynamic is accentuated when
the values and associated with beliefs are connected to group with
which a person strongly identifies. Individuals depend on group
membership for various benefits—material, reputational, and emotional. 56 Individuals thus have even more incentive to resist acceptance of information that threatens to drive a wedge between them
and their peers. Accordingly, as a means of psychological selfprotection, individuals selectively credit information depending on
whether it bolsters or challenges beliefs that cohere with their selfdefining values, particularly ones that predominate in or support
practices important to a self-defining group. 57
The third supporting theory is cultural cognition of risk. Cultural
cognition refers to the tendency of persons, as a result of identityprotective cognition and other mechanisms, to conform beliefs about
the extent of societal dangers to shared understandings of how society should be organized. 58 Persons who hold an “individualist”
worldview, for example, react skeptically to claims of environmental
53 Serena Chen, Kimberly Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated Heuristic and

Systematic Processing, 10 Psych. Inq. 44, 45 (1999).
54 See, of course, David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. 3, pt 1, § 1 (1739-

40).
55 See generally Cohen et al., Partisan Divide, supra note 3.
56 See generally Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for In-

terpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 Psychol. Bull. 497
(1995).
57 See generally Sherman & Cohen, supra note 3, at 119-20; Cohen et al., Partisan Di-

vide, supra note 3; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, supra note 3; Serena Chen, Kimberly
Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 10 Psychol.
Inq. 44 (1999).
58 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of
Democracy: A Cultural Critique of Sunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1071 (2006).
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risks, the widespread acceptance of which would threaten the autonomy of markets and other private orderings; persons who subscribe
to an “egalitarian” worldview, in contrast, find it congenial to credit
such claims because they justify regulating commercial activities productive of inequalities in wealth and status. Cultural norms can also
generate variance in the risk perceptions of those who share a worldview: hierarchical and individualistic men, for example, rely much
more on access to firearms to enable their performance of cultural
roles, and thus tend to be much more skeptical of the risks guns pose
to society, than do hierarchical and individualistic women. 59
The Self-Defensive Cognition Model blends these three theories
together. Self-defense doctrine supplies a particular type of blaming
template. Accordingly, one might expect, consistent with the culpable
control theory, that persons evaluating self-defense cases would conform their perceptions of the elements of that template—whether the
putative aggressor did in fact pose a deadly threat to the defender;
whether the defender honestly and reasonably perceived matters in
that way; whether the defender’s capacity to avoid any threat by nondeadly alternatives—to extradoctrinal social norms. The theory of
self-protective cognition implies that those norms are likely to be
ones that are central to their identities.
For its part, the cultural cognition theory suggests which norms
are likely to have this impact—namely, the ones associated with the
worldviews that that theory features. Appraisals of self-defense, like
appraisals of the dangers of climate change, gun possession, socially
deviant behavior, and the like, involve perceptions of risk. And like
those issues, controversial self-defense cases are likely to be controversial precisely because they are pregnant with implications for
competing norms, hierarchical and egalitarian, individualistic and
communitarian. Does racism remain prevalent in public attitudes and
behavior? Is society organized in an objectionably patriarchical fashion? Is our society being damaged by a decline in authority in public
and private spheres? Is that decline a byproduct of an excessive concern about racial or gender inequality? Is the law typically an instrument of repression of vulnerable groups? Or is the law now insuffi59 See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K. Mertz,

Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White Male Effect in Risk Perception,
J.
Empirical
L.
Stud.
(forthcoming
2007)
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995634.
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ciently responsive to protecting law-abiding citizens from predation
by lawbreakers? Is private physical force an appropriate means for
securing order, in public or private domains? Is the protection of individuals from unwarranted violence primarily a responsibility of the
community or is it an inalienable prerogative of those individuals
themselves? Even if individuals don’t understand themselves to be
answering these questions when they apply self-defense doctrine, they
are impelled to views of the facts supportive of their preferred answers.
Values do drive outcome judgments, on this account, but in a
manner different from that contemplated by proponents of the Partisan Value Model. The abuse excuse critics paint too cynical a picture
of self-defense decisionmakers. Such individuals aren’t brazenly ignoring facts that disappoint their partisan values; they are honestly
deciding based on the facts, albeit the ones that their values dispose
them to perceive. The New Normativists, in contrast, impute too
much sophistication to the protagonists in political disputes over selfdefense cases. These citizens aren’t covert Aristotelians engaged in
appraising offenders’ and victims’ motives and characters against the
background of dueling conceptions of the good life. 60 Nor are they
(outside of Stanford law classrooms, certainly, but probably even inside them) epistemologically skeptical “antipositivists” who are strategically availing themselves of “Enlightenment dogma—facts are
universal, values particular”—to disguise their agenda to conform the
law to their “aspirations.” 61 Culturally diverse individuals (jurors, but
citizens forming judgments about self-defense cases generally) honestly believe they are putting their own partisan commitments aside
and basing their judgments on their perception of the facts in exactly
the way the Neutral Umpire Model contemplates. But because their
partisan values shape their cognition of the facts, they systematically
differ in their perceptions of “balls” and “strikes”.
This interpretation of political conflict over self-defense verdicts,
we’re convinced, raises a thicket of complicated normative and pre60 Cf. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 304 (claiming that “it is possible to

make sense of the law only by imputing to it a theory of moral accountability consistent with the evaluative conception of emotion” such as “Aristotle's position on
character—that it is appropriate to expect a person to value the right things, in the
right ways, at the right times”).
61 Kelman, supra note 1, at 202.
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scriptive questions. By delimiting the conditions under which private
citizens can avail themselves of lethal violence, self-defense doctrine
plays an important regulatory function. But as our account of its rationale makes clear, the doctrine also performs a critical political function, affirming the law’s humanist commitment to the supreme value of
human life and the equal value of all citizens’ lives. The doctrine obviously can’t perform either of these functions effectively if citizens
ignore the facts and rely instead on partisan group commitments
when they appraise instances of private violence. But can it do it effectively if citizens honestly conform their judgment to facts that
cognitively derive their partisan values? Do factual disagreements
founded on self-defensive cognition pose challenges to the accuracy
of verdicts, or to their political legitimacy, that are any different from
factual disagreements originating in myriad other sources? If so, is
there anything that can be done to mute the impact of this particular
psychological dynamic?
Interesting questions, we believe. But the importance of answering them presupposes that the Self-Defensive Cognition Model really
does explain political conflict over self-defense verdicts. Whether that
is so is, of course, an empirical question. And it is one that we conducted an experimental study to try to answer.

II. THE EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
We conducted an experimental study designed to pit the Neutral
Umpire, Partisan Value, and Self-Defensive Cognition Models against
one another. As we’ll explain in more detail, subjects read one of two
vignettes patterned on the iconic “battered woman” and “beleaguered commuter” cases. Subjects then responded to a battery of
questions, which were analyzed to assess the relationship between the
subjects’ perceptions of key facts, their positions on the appropriate
results in the cases, and their values, political leanings, and other individual characteristics, all of which were also measured.
Although subjects were requested to adopt the perspective of jurors in the cases, the design of the study was primarily intended to
shed light on how members of the public form judgments about controversial self-defense cases generally. Political conflict over selfdefense verdicts is the phenomenon we are trying to explain. Such
conflict inheres less in the verdicts of individual juries than in public
reactions to them. Members of the public (not unlike law students in

Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense

27

the classroom) react, by and large, not to their first-hand exposure to
the evidence presented in such cases but rather to more abbreviated,
derivative accounts that, like our vignettes, tend to be subject to
competing interpretations. On what basis, then, are members of the
public forming such confident conclusions about the correctness or
incorrectness of jury verdicts in such cases? Are they relying on their
best albeit speculative judgments about the facts? Are they simply
reacting to the more accessible cultural or political overtones such
cases present? Or are they, as the Self-Defensive Cognition Model
supposes being motivated to resolve factual ambiguities in the manner most supportive of their defining commitments?
A. Study Design and Hypotheses
1. Sample
The study sample consisted of approximately 1,600 individuals.
Approximately 51% female, 75% white, and 9% African-American,
the subjects were drawn randomly from a demographically diverse
and nationally representative panel of some 40,000 on-line survey
respondents assembled by Knowledge Networks for participation in
scholarly public opinion analysis. 62
2. Vignettes
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatment
groups, which were labeled “Battered Woman” and “Beleaguered
Commuter,” respectively. 63 In the former, subjects read a vignette in
which Julie, a woman chronically beaten and degraded by William,
her abusive husband, shot him in the head as he slept. In the latter,
subjects read a vignette in which George, a middle-aged white man,
shot and killed Alvin, a male African-American teenager, on a subway
62 Numerous studies have shown that the on-line samples and testing methods of
Knowledge Networks yield results equivalent in reliability to conventional randomdigit-dial surveys, and studies based on those samples and methods are routinely
published
in
academic
journals.
See
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/2005aapor.html;
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/List%20of%20Journals%20828-2006.pdf A more complete description of the composition of Knowledge Networks and of the demographic characteristics of the sample used in this study appears in Appendix A.
63 The vignettes appear in Appendix A.
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platform after Alvin stated, “Give me some money, man.” The vignettes were described as presenting the “facts and evidence” in “a
controversial criminal trial,” and each subject was advised that we
were interested “to know what you would decide if you were on the
jury in that trial.” Although patterned loosely on real cases (State v.
Norman 64 and State v. Goetz, 65 respectively), the vignettes were structured to be reasonably parallel in a number of respects that we anticipated would generate factual disagreements among subjects. 66
a. Victim dangerousness. In both vignettes, the facts were characterized in a manner intended to create ambiguity as to whether the victim posed—or might reasonably have been perceived to pose—an
immediate threat of death or great bodily harm. The most obvious
reason to doubt that in Battered Woman was that William was sleeping at the time he was shot. Nevertheless, he had beaten Julie earlier
in the day and was now only napping, suggesting the possibility that
he might at any moment awaken and immediately resume his pattern
of violence. At least some persons, then, would likely credit as reasonable Julie’s (professed) perception that she had to act immediately
because she “knew when [William] woke up this time he was going to
hurt me really bad.”
In Beleaguered Commuter, Alvin had no previous contact of any
sort, violent or otherwise, with George and had not explicitly threatened him. Nevertheless, Alvin’s request for money would likely strike
some, but certainly not all, persons as menacing, and George stated
that he “could tell from [Alvin’s] body language and the aggressive
tone of his voice” that Alvin “was going to hurt me real bad.” Some,
but certainly not all, persons would also likely view Alvin’s race, age,
and gender, as well as the urban setting of the encounter, as reinforcing the inference that Alvin’s request for money was a prelude to a
violent attack. 67
A “pocket knife” was also found on Alvin’s person. Those disposed to see him as potentially dangerous would likely see this fact as
64 78 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
65 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
66 In this respect, we were guided in particular by Kelman’s superb discussion of

the factual parallels in the iconic cases as they are typically presented in law school
discussions. See Kelman, supra note 1.
67 See Armour, supra note 1, at 790-93.
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confirmation of Alvin’s violent intentions. Others would point out
that George didn’t have any awareness that Alvin was carrying the
knife, possession of which is consistent with perfectly innocent intentions (including self-defensive ones on Alvin’s own part).
b. Previous exposure to violence. In both vignettes, the defendants
were described as having been exposed to previous acts of violence.
This parallel too injects factual ambiguity into both cases.
Julie had suffered repeated physical beatings at the hands of William, “some of which resulted in injuries (facial cuts; broken ribs;
twice a broken nose) requiring emergency medical treatment.” This
behavior, in addition to reinforcing the impression that William
posed an objectively reasonable threat of violence, also supports the
inference that Julie honestly perceived William would harm her upon
awakening.
Yet one could also draw exactly the opposite set of inferences.
William’s “persistent[] abuse[]” of Julie “during their ten-year marriage,” some might argue, had never created the degree of risk—one of
“death or great bodily harm”—contemplated by the doctrine. So why
suppose that Julie honestly or reasonably perceived that she faced a
threat of that magnitude in this instance?
One reply is that precisely because she had endured so many attacks over so long a period, Julie had developed unique insight into
William’s propensities and was thus better situated than anyone else
to gauge whether “this time,” as she said, “he was going to hurt [her]
really bad.” 68 But just as plausibly (some might think) the string of
violent but nonlethal attacks could be viewed as supplying Julie with a
motive—resentment or hatred—to kill William notwithstanding the
absence of any genuine apprehension that failing to do so would have
put her at risk of a deadly attack.
George had suffered three previous muggings, during one of
which he had “been beaten and required fifteen stitches under his
eye.” These attacks had been carried out by persons other than Alvin.
Nevertheless, some might conclude that a person who had been
68 See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 374 (N.J. 1984) (“Depending on its content, the

expert's testimony might also enable the jury to find that the battered wife, because
of the prior beatings, numerous beatings, as often as once a week, for seven years,
from the day they were married to the day he died, is particularly able to predict
accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on her.”).
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mugged multiple times in the past would be more likely to perceive
he was about to be assaulted again in a situation like the one George
faced. 69 In addition, because the muggers in those instances, too, had
been “teenaged, African American males,” it is plausible to imagine
(that is, to imagine some readers’ imagining) that Alvin’s race, age,
and gender might have created at least an honest apprehension on
George’s part that Alvin also meant him harm. 70
But again opposing inferences are also possible. The previous
muggings, although in one case quite violent, hadn’t (some would say;
others would disagree) posed a lethal risk, so why suppose George
either honestly or reasonably perceived he’d be subjected to that level
of physical danger rather than merely robbed? The reply might be
that the previous muggings, combined with experience from urban
living generally, endowed George with superior insight into the violent potential of such interactions, one that people without a similar
background are in particular unfit to second guess. 71 But just as plausibly (to some), those muggings could be understood to have filled
George with a passion—informed, very likely, by racial animus—to
avenge the humiliating treatment he perceived himself to have suffered. In that case, George might have been expected to lash out with
lethal violence against Alvin, as a symbolic representative of the class
of persons who had mistreated him, despite the lack of any genuine
(much less reasonable) apprehension that Alvin posed a deadly threat.
c. Opportunity to flee. Another parallel in the vignettes relates to the
feasibility of flight as an alternative to the use of deadly violence.
Julie, some would observe, could have (indeed, would have) simply
left her home during William’s nap if she genuinely perceived that he
would attack her upon awakening. But others would likely dispute the
feasibility of flight (to where? for how long? without packing essentials—or after taking the time to do so, incurring the risk of discovery
and violent retaliation by a roused William, etc.). They could bolster

69 See Kelman, supra note 1, at 174-75.
70 See Armour, supra note 1, at 799-800.
71 See Kelman, supra note 1, at 175; cf. Elijah Anderson, Streetwise: Race, Class, and

Change in an Urban Community (1990) (observing that urban residents develop
intuitive sensitivity to “code of the street” that is essential to avoiding dangerous
confrontations).
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their reasoning with the rationale, if not the letter, of the so-called
“Castle Doctrine.” 72
Similar issues arise in the Beleaguered Commuter case. George,
it might be thought, could have (would have) backed away, yelled for
help, or simply turned and run had he really thought that he was
about to be mugged, much less lethally assaulted. But some would
dismiss this suggestion as naïve, the product likely of inexperience
with the resolve of violent inner-city criminals, the cramped confines
of crowded subway stations, and the cowardice or selfish indifference
of urban residents in the face of the brazen acts of predation. Much
like an “uplifted knife,” 73 it could be said, such circumstances do not
conduce to calm assessments of one’s options.
d. Previous involvement of police. The defendants in both vignettes
were also depicted as having previously availed themselves unsuccessfully of police assistance. George reported each of the three previous
muggings, “but the police failed to make any arrests.” Some readers
might suspect that the apparent lack of ability on the part of the state
to protect George (and one might suppose other mugging victims)
would increase his anxiety and fear and thus dispose him honestly
(perhaps even reasonably) to perceive the need to use self-help to
protect himself from serious harm. Others would see the same experiences with the police as a motivation to resort to vigilantism.
“Three times the police arrested William for assaulting Julie, but
released him from custody each time after Julie declined to press
charges.” Julie’s failure to follow through might be thought to support the inference that she wasn’t genuinely convinced that he posed
a deadly threat. And if she didn’t see him that way in general, it seems
less likely she would have perceived him that way on the occasion in
which she finally shot him. Alternatively, Julie might be thought to
72 In many jurisdictions, the “Castle Doctrine” would not excuse retreat in a case
involving cohabitants. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, The Castle
Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 653, 671-72 (2003). Nevertheless, in
those states, a jury could still consider the difficulty of or uncertainty surrounding
escape in determining whether a person who used deadly force against a cohabitant
honestly and reasonably perceived a threat of death or great bodily harm. See, e.g.,
Cooper v. United States, 512 A.2d 1002, 1004 (D.C. 1986). Our subjects received no
specific instructions relating to Castle Doctrine or to the duty (or lack thereof) to
retreat in self-defense cases.
73 Brown, 256 U.S. at 343.
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have dropped the charges because of a well-founded perception that
pressing charges would only increase her risk by infuriating William,
whom the state would not have the resources or resolve to incapacitate. If so, one might find it easier to imagine that Julie would have
formed the honest (perhaps even reasonable) belief that one day
she’d need to use lethal force to incapacitate William herself.
e. Premeditation. Both defendants shot and killed their victims with
handguns. George obtained his weapon after the third mugging; Julie
obtained hers from her mother’s home on the day she shot William,
after he had severely beaten her. One could see the decision of either
defendant or of both as evidencing a premeditated motive to kill for
purposes of vengeance or vindication of dignity, honor, or autonomy.
Alternatively, one could see the decision of either or both as manifesting a level of fear that matured into an honest (even reasonable)
perception of deadly risk at the fateful moment when the victim was
shot.
f. Expert psychiatric testimony. Each defendant was described as
having presented expert psychiatric testimony at trial. Subjects who
read Battered Woman learned that “Dr. Leonard Wallace, a Ph.D.
psychiatrist on the faculty of a major university,” had testified that
Julie was suffering from “battered woman syndrome”; subjects who
read Beleaguered Commuter learned that that the same witness had
testified that George was suffering from “post-traumatic stress disorder.” Readers could have understood Dr. Wallace’s description of the
offenders’ respective conditions as supporting the genuineness of
their perceptions that they honestly faced inescapable threats to their
lives. Readers so inclined could also have treated his testimony as
evidence of the reasonableness of either offender’s perception, given
Dr. Wallace’s characterization of the effect of previous exposure to
violence “on [his or her] psyche.” Finally, Dr. Wallace’s statements
on the stand echoed each defendant’s own claim that he or she “felt
no choice” but shoot the victim, an element of each vignette designed to suggest excusing impairment of volition.
Nevertheless, readers of either case could also have dismissed
the testimony of Dr. Wallace, a defense witness, as noncredible. Indeed, a reader disposed to accept the “abuse excuse” critique
(whether as a result of prior exposure to it or as a result an instinctive
skepticism of psychiatric testimony) could even have treated the
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presence of Dr. Wallace’s testimony as confirming the absence of any
genuine merit in the defendant’s self-defense claim.
3. Measures
a. Perception of Facts. We measured subjects’ perceptions of various facts by asking them to indicate on a six-point scale the level of
their agreement or disagreement with various propositions. The
propositions concerned facts that a juror would likely consider if she
were motivated to decide her assigned case consistent with selfdefense doctrine understood in light of its conventional justificationbased and excuse-based rationales:
It isn’t likely that [William/Alvin] would have severely harmed or
killed [Julie/George] if [Julie/George] hadn’t shot him.
It was unreasonable for [Julie/George] to shoot [William/Alvin]
because there were other ways [she/he] could have protected [herself/himself].
Because [Julie/George] suffered from [battered woman syndrome/post-traumatic stress syndrome], [Julie/George] can’t be
blamed for any mistake [she/he] may have made about how much
of a danger [William/Alvin] posed at the time [Julie/George] shot
him.
Because [she had been beaten so many times before/George had
been violently mugged before], [Julie/George] was in a better situation than other people to judge how much of a danger [William/Alvin] posed to [her/him] when he shot him.
The failure of the police to keep [her/him] safe gave [Julie/George]
good reason to believe [she/he] had to use deadly force to protect
[herself/himself].
[William/Alvin] himself was responsible for causing [Julie/George]
to believe [she/he] faced a threat of death or grievous bodily harm.

Considered individually or jointly, these items are only a proxy
for a subject’s perception of the facts in the case. Accordingly, subject responses to the fact items in both the Battered Woman and Beleaguered Commuter treatment groups were combined into scales,
BW_Facts and BC_Facts, which by virtue of their high degree of reliability (α = .73 and α = .77, respectively) can be regarded as valid indicators of subjects’ latent dispositions to adopt interpretations of the

Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense

34

facts supportive or hostile to the respective defendant’s self-defense
claims. 74
b. Outcome Judgments. In each treatment group, subjects were instructed to that the cases would be decided according to the following legal directives:
Murder. Anyone who intentionally kills another person without a
lawful defense is guilty of murder and shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.
Self-defense. A person has a defense to murder if that person honestly
and reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary to repel an
immediate threat of death or severe bodily harm.

The subjects’ own perceptions of the appropriate results in the cases
were measured with two items, which stated propositions with which
the subjects were to indicate on a six-point scale the level of their
agreement or disagreement:
[Julie/George] should be convicted of murder.
[Julie/George] should be acquitted of murder because she killed in
self-defense

Responses again formed highly reliable scales (BW_Aquit, α = .87;
BC_Acquit, α = .79), which were used to represent latent dispositions
to acquit the respective defendants.
c. Cultural worldviews. Subjects’ “cultural worldviews” were also
measured. The purpose of collecting this information was to facilitate
assessment of the subjects’ worldviews in their perceptions of the
facts and their assessments of the appropriate result.
The worldview scales were patterned on a scheme developed by
the late anthropologist Mary Douglas. Douglas characterizes worldviews, or preferences for how society should be organized, along two
cross-cutting dimensions, “group” and “grid.” 75 A “high group”
worldview generates a preference for a communitarian ordering in
74 Cronbach’s alpha (α) is a statistic for measuring the internal validity of attitudinal

scales. In effect, it measures the degree of intercorrelation that exists among various items within a scale; a high score suggests that the items can be treated as a
valid measure of a latent, or unmeasured, attitude or trait. Generally, α ≥ .70 suggests scale validity. See generally Jose M. Cortina, What Is Coefficient Alpha: An Examination of Theory and Applications, 78 J. Applied Psychol. 98 (1993).
75 See Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (1970).
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which the interests of the individual are subordinated to the needs of
the collective, which is in turn responsible for securing the conditions
of individual flourishing. A “low group” worldview, in contrast, coheres with a preference for an individualist ordering in which individuals are expected to secure the conditions of their own flourishing
without interference or assistance from the collective. A “high grid”
worldview corresponds to a preference for a relatively hierarchical ordering, in which entitlements, obligations, opportunities and offices
are all assigned on the basis of conspicuous and largely fixed attributes, such as gender, race, lineage, class, and the like. A “low grid”
worldview, in contrast, generates a preference for an egalitarian ordering that emphatically rejects the proposition that such distinctions
should figure in this way in societal conditions.
The two dimensions of worldview contemplated by “groupgrid” were measured (before subjects read the assigned vignette and
responded the fact and result items) with scales used in previous
studies of the cultural cognition of risk. 76 “IndividualismCommunitarianism” (or simply, “Individualism”) consisted of “disagree-agree” items that assessed the relative priority that subjects assigned to group and individual interests (e.g., “The government
should do more to advance society’s goals, even if that means limiting
the freedom and choices of individuals”) and their expectations about
how responsibilities should be divided between society and its members (e.g., “Too many people today expect society to do things for
them that they should be doing for themselves”). “HierarchyEgalitarianism” (or simply, “Hierarchy”) consisted of items that assessed subjects’ attitudes toward socially stratified roles (e.g., “We
have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country”) and their
toward deviancy from the same (e.g., “A lot of problems in our society today come from the decline in the traditional family, where the
man works and the woman stays home”). Both Individualism
(α = .84) and Hierarchy (α = .82) were highly reliable measures of the
latent disposition of subjects toward those respective sets of worldviews.
To facilitate comparisons of subjects identified by their worldviews, we assigned subjects to cultural groups. Based on the relationship of their scores to the median on each scale, we classified subjects
76 See Kahan et al., supra note 59.
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as either “Hierarchs” or “Egalitarians” and as either “Individualists”
or “Communitarians.”
d. Individual characteristics generally. Finally, we collected data on
various other individual characteristics that we anticipated might influence subjects’ perceptions of the facts and results in the Battered
Woman and Beleaguered Commuter cases. These included sociodemographic characteristics, such as gender, race, household income,
education level, and community type (urban or nonurban). They also
included political dispositions, measured by self-reported ideology
(on a seven-point, liberal-conservativism scale) and party affiliation
(Democrat, Republican, Independent/Other).
4. Hypotheses
We have proposed that self-defensive cognition generates political conflict over self-defense cases. The study was geared to permit
testing of several discrete sets of hypotheses that flow out of this
claim.
a. Overall effect of values. One is that the Battered Woman and Beleaguered Commuter vignettes would in fact divide subjects of diverse values. Consensus on the outcomes, or disagreement unrelated
to partisan values, would be consistent with the Neutral Umpire
Model. We predicted, however, that our vignettes would in fact generate mirror-image forms of political polarization.
Thus, in the Battered Woman condition, subjects who identified
themselves as liberals and Democrats, we surmised, would be inclined to accept, those who identified themselves as conservatives
and Republicans to reject, the defendant’s asserted claim of selfdefense. In the Beleaguered Commuter condition, the positions of
subjects so defined would be reversed.
We anticipated similar patterns for subjects defined by their cultural worldviews. For Hierarchs, the behavior of the victim in Beleaguered Commuter would likely connote the breakdown of social order in urban settings, and the response of the defendant a righteous
vindication of the honor of norm-abiding persons. Egalitarians, in
contrast, would readily identify the defendant’s behavior, and positive
reactions to them, with racial dominance. Individualists, we conjectured, would see in the defendant’s resort to self-help a virtuous assertion of self-reliance. Communitarians, in contrast, would likely associate the defendant’s response with an encroachment on the pre-
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rogative of society at large to secure order. They would also likely
resent approval of his actions as an implicit denial of society’s complicity in conditions that conduce to crime and disorder, and its obligation to ameliorate the same. We thus predicted that Hierarchs and
Individualists, but not Egalitarians and Communitarians, would be
disposed to credit the defendant’s self-defense claim.
The Battered Woman vignette, too, is ripe with competing cultural meanings. Egalitarians would thus likely equate approval of the
defendant’s self-defense claim in that case with due recognition of the
injustice of male domination and society’s failure to take effective
action to protect women from domestic violence. Hierarchs might
not be completely averse to the use of physical force as a mode of
maintaining discipline within a well-ordered home; but even if (as
likely) they understood William to have engaged in violence unsanctioned by an prerogative associated with his role, they would likely
react skeptically to the “battered woman defense” as evidencing general hostility to patriarchal modes of household organization. We thus
predicted that Egalitarians but not Hierarchs would be inclined to
afford Julie a defense.
The Battered Woman case was likely to strike Communitarians
and Individualists, however, as less clear cut. We surmised that
Communitarians would likely see William’s behavior as a tyrannical
breach of norms of solidarity that should inform household life. At
the same time, they would also likely be leery of Julie’s resort to selfhelp, much as they would be leery of George’s in the Beleaguered
Commuter condition, as a tacit denigration of societal prerogatives
and responsibilities to police such breaches. By the same token, Individualists might well approve of Julie’s resort to self-help, much as
they would George’s, as an expression of virtuous self-reliance. However, it also struck as possible that Individualists would react less
sympathetically to Julie insofar as use of a gun for self-protection
would likely seem more in keeping with individualist norms that define male roles of men than those that define female ones. 77 We thus
formed no clear hypothesis about the likely effect of the Individualist-Communitarian dimension of cultural worldview on subjects’ outcome judgments in that condition.

77 See id.
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b. Values, results, and fact perceptions. We hypothesized not only that
subjects’ values would generate differences of opinion on the correct
outcomes in the two cases, but also that they would do so in the
manner associated with the Self-Defensive Cognition Model.
Whereas the Partisan Value Model posits that values determine favored outcomes in controversial cases directly, the Self-Defensive
Cognition Model assumes that values determine outcome judgments
indirectly (and subconsciously), though the influence that values have
on decisionmakers’ perceptions of the facts. Accordingly, we predicted that the impact of partisan values on subjects’ outcome judgments would, in both conditions, be mediated by the impact of those
values on subjects’ perceptions of the facts. That is, after controlling
for their impact on fact perceptions, subjects’ values, we predicted,
would not explain variance in their views of what the results in the
cases should be.
We also predicted that cultural worldviews would have a larger
impact on subjects’ perceptions of facts than would their political
ideologies and party affiliations. Because conventional political commitments cohere with group commitments essential to individuals’
identities, it would be perfectly consistent with the Self-Defensive
Cognition Model for them to influence subjects’ factual perceptions.
But based on previous studies, we anticipated that cultural worldviews would exert a greater influence than ideology and party affiliation, in part because the worldview constructs furnish a more nuanced representation of how individuals’ defining values vary and in
part because worldview measures do better than do political commitment ones in explaining that policy preferences of individuals with
moderate degrees of political sophistication. 78
c. Impact of other individual characteristics. We anticipated that other
individual characteristics would also likely correspond with differences in outcome judgments in the cases. We predicted, in particular,
that women would likely be more disposed than men to credit the
self-defense claim in Battered Woman and that whites would be more

78 See Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural The-

ory of Preference Formation, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1 (1987); Donald Braman, Dan M.
Kahan & Paul Slovic, The Wildavsky Heuristic: The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political
Opinion
(July
2005)
(unpublished
manuscript,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=341841).
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disposed than African-Americans to credit the self-defense claim in
Beleaguered Commuter.
Such effects could reflect a number of mechanisms. One would
be a connection between these characteristics and self-defining group
commitments that influence how individuals react to the cases. Gender and race might themselves be groups of the sort or might correlate with others (political affiliations, e.g.) that are. If so, women
might differ from men and African-Americans from whites either as
a result of the direct effect of partisan group values on outcome judgments or as a result of the indirect effect of such values on fact perceptions.
Another reason to expect race and gender effects would be the
correlation of these characteristics with differences in experiences,
unrelated to values, that bear on individuals’ perception of the facts
in the cases. Women, for example, might more readily take note of
instances of domestic violence, or feel more vulnerable to it, and thus
credit asserted fears of it more readily than do men. Likewise, whites
might more readily take note of or otherwise feel vulnerable to interracial violence and thus more readily credit expressed fears of it than
do African-Americans; or African-Americans might be more aware of
instances of racism than are whites, and thus more readily impute
racist motives to persons in the position of the defendant in the Beleaguered Commuter case.
We formulated a number of testable hypotheses aimed at sorting
these possibilities out. One was that gender and race would not influence subjects’ outcome judgments directly, in a manner unmediated
by their effect on subjects’ perceptions of the facts. Such a finding
would rule out the inference that gender and race were connected to
group commitments that influence subjects’ decisionmaking in the
manner posited by the Partisan Value Model.
Another hypothesis was that the impact of one or more direct
partisan-value measures—either cultural worldviews, political ideology, or party affiliation—would persist even after the impact of gender, race, and other demographic characteristics on fact perceptions
was taken into account. Absent such a finding, it would be impossible
to rule out the possibility that political conflict over self-defense verdicts arises from demographic characteristics that generate experience-based variance in fact perceptions unrelated to values. Indeed, it
would arguably be consistent with the Neutral Umpire Model to find
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that neither cultural worldviews, political ideology, nor party affiliation generate variance in fact perceptions (or judgments of results
directly) after controlling for race, gender, and other individual characteristics. Conversely, a finding that individual characteristics exert
little or no impact on fact perceptions relative to direct partisan-value
measures would be most strongly corroborative of the Self-Defensive
Cognition Model.
Cultural
Worldviews

Other Individual
Characteristics

Fact
Perceptions

Result

Ideology & Party
Affiliation
Strong effect
Moderate or weak effect
Weak or no effect

Figure 4. Summary of Hypotheses on Influence of Values, Other Characteristics, and
Fact Perceptions on Correct Result

5. Statistical Tests
We analyzed the results with several statistical tests. We computed the percentage of subjects defined by their values and by their
individual characteristics who favored either acquitting or convicting
the defendants, and the mean scores of subject so identified on the
verdict scales (BW_Aquit and BC_Acquit). Those results enable us to
evaluate hypotheses on the overall effects of values and individual
characteristics on preferred results in the cases.
We used structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the hypothesized relationship between values, characteristics, fact perceptions, and outcome judgments. Combining factor analysis for latent
variables, linear regression, and path analysis, SEM enables the influence of independent variables on a dependent variable and on one
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another to be measured simultaneously. 79 As such, it is particularly
well suited for testing hypothesis that involve mediating relationships
between latent variables such as attitudes and beliefs. 80 We used
SEM techniques to assess the relative strength of models in which
values, individual characteristics, and fact perceptions exerted the effects on one another and on subjects’ outcome judgments predicted
by the Neutral Umpire Model, the Partisan Value Model, and the
Self-Defensive Cognition Model, respectively.
Statistical power for the SEM analyses was ample. The size of
the subsamples was 838 and 772 for the Battered Woman and the
Battered Commuter conditions, respectively. Accordingly, at a twotailed significance criterion of .05, the likelihood of detecting small to
medium effect sizes (r = .25) was well over 95% for the planned
SEM analyses. 81 Accordingly, nonsignificance findings are not appropriately attributable to type II error. 82
6. Missing Data
Missing data were modest (< 5% of the values overall). Stochastic regression was used to impute missing values. 83
B. Results
We report the results in two steps. We start with a summary of
simple outcome judgments, overall and across subjects of different
types, in both conditions. We then present, again for both conditions,
the SEM analyses of the relationship between subjects’ values, their
fact perceptions and their preferred outcomes.

79 See generally Rebecca Weston & Jr. Paul A. Gore, A Brief Guide to Structural Equation Modeling, 34 Counseling Psychol. 719 (2006).
80 See id. at 719-20.
81 Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences tbls. 2.3.5,

t3.3.5 (1988).
82 See generally David L Streiner, Unicorns Do Exist: A Tutorial on “Proving” the Null

Hypothesis, 48 Canadian J. Psychiatry 756 (2003).
83 See generally Roderick J.A. Little & Donald B. Rubin, The Analysis of Social-Science
Data with Missing Values, 18 Social Method Res. 292 (1989).
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1. Simple Outcome Judgments
Outcome judgments for each condition are reflected in Table 1.
The values for “guilty” and “self-def” reflect the percentage of the
subjects of the specified type who “agreed” either mildly, modestly,
or strongly with the proposition that the relevant defendant should
be convicted of murder or acquitted on grounds of self-defense. The
difference between 100% and the sum of “guilty” and “self-def” reflects the percentage of subjects who disagreed with both propositions, possibly because they believed the defendant should be convicted of some crime, just not murder.

Overall
Men
Women
Whites
Blacks
Republicans
Democrats
Conservatives
Liberals
Hierarchs
Egalitarians
Individualists
Communitarians

Battered Woman
Guilty
Self-Def
47%
46%
50%
44%
44%
47%
48%
44%
41%
42%
51%
40%
43%
49%
56%
38%
42%
50%
51%
40%
42%
49%
51%
43%
43%
48%

Beleaguered Commuter
Guilty
Self-Def
33%
56%
34%
54%
32%
57%
29%
61%
56%
32%
24%
66%
39%
50%
23%
66%
43%
46%
23%
67%
44%
43%
26%
65%
40%
45%

For Battered Woman, n = 838; for Beleaguered Commuter, n = 772. Bold typeface indicates significant difference (p ≤ .10) between percentages of subjects
within paired groups “agreeing” with indicated outcome.

Table 1. Outcome Judgments Overall and by Class of Subject

Both cases were reasonably controversial overall. Battered
Woman was especially close, dividing subjects more or less evenly.
To our surprise, compared to subjects in Battered Woman, subjects
in Beleaguered Commuter were on the whole considerably more disposed to acquit. Nevertheless, with 44% of the subjects unwilling to
exonerate the defendant on grounds of self-defense and 33% willing
to convict him of murder, sentiment for acquittal in Battered Commuter was by no means overwhelming.
Outcome judgments displayed the opposing forms of polarization. Subjects who identified themselves as “conservatives” or “Re-
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publicans” were significantly more disposed toward conviction in
Battered Woman, and toward acquittal in Beleaguered Commuter,
than were subjects who identified themselves as “liberals” or “Democrats.” Egalitarians and Communitarians were significantly more
disposed toward conviction in Beleaguered Commuter (although in
absolute terms they were fairly evenly divided) than were Hierarchs
and Individualists. Also as predicted, Egalitarians were also significantly more disposed toward acquittal than were Hierarchs in Battered Woman. We were unsure how subjects defined with reference
to their worldviews along the Individualism-Communitarian dimension would react in Battered Woman, but it turned out that Individualists were significantly more inclined to convict (although not significantly less inclined to acquit on grounds of self-defense).
The relationship between outcome judgments and other individual characteristics also matched our predictions. As hypothesized,
whites were significantly more disposed toward acquittal in Battered
Commuter than were African-Americans, and men were significantly
more disposed than women toward conviction in Battered Woman
(although differences between the two were not significant with respect to acquitting on grounds of self-defense).
2. SEM Analysis
SEM analyses were performed separately for both Beleaguered
Commuter and Battered Woman. In each case, we started by testing
for adequacy of fitness a model that reflected the hypothesized relationship between values, individual characteristics, fact perceptions
and outcome judgments. We then assessed the fit and strength of this
model in comparison to others that reflected different hypotheses
about the relationship of these variables.
SEM analysis features a notoriously wide variety of “goodness of
fit” indexes. 84 The “exact fit” or chi-square (χ2) test is the most
common one, but is known to generate a high rate of false rejections
of adequate models, particularly when sample sizes are even modestly
large. 85 Not surprisingly, every model tested in connection with both
84 See generally Weston & Gore, supra note 79, at 741
85 See Paul Barrett, Structural Equation Modeling: Adjudging Model Fit, 42 Personality &

Individual Differences 815 (2007) (“Mathematically, this occurs as the sample size
is a ‘multiplier’ of the discrepancy function in the exact-fit test. In general, the larger the sample size, the more likely a model will fail to fit via using the χ2 goodness
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the Beleaguered Commuter (n = 772) and Battered Woman (n = 838)
failed the χ2 test. “Researchers have addressed the χ2 limitations by
developing goodness-of-fit indexes that take a more pragmatic approach to the evaluation process.” 86 We selected as our pragmatic
goodness-of-fit tests that have been deemed especially suitable for
large-sample studies of latent personality and related traits in social
psychology: 87 (1) relative chi-square (χ2/df) < 5; (2) standardized root
mean square residual (SRMR) ≤ .08; and (3) root mean square error
of approximation (RMSEA) ≤ .08. 88
a. Beleaguered Commuter analyses. Figure 5 displays the model constructed to test the hypotheses generated by the Self-Defensive Cognition Model as applied to Beleaguered Commuter. The only direct
influence on outcome judgments (“Acquittal,” as measured by the
latent variable, BC_Acquittal) is subjects’ perceptions of the facts
(“Pro-Dfdt Fact Perceptions,” as measured by the latent variable
BC_Facts). 89 Subjects’ partisan values (reflected in the ideology and
party affiliation measures and the latent cultural worldview variables)
influence their outcome judgments only indirectly through the influof fit test.”); Sik-Yum Lee, Structural Equation Modeling: a Bayesian Approach
111 (2007) (“As pointed out in the statistic literature there are problems associated
with [χ2],” which rejects models “too frequently with large sample sizes.” (citations
omitted); Barbara M. Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling with AMOS: Basic
Concepts, Applications, and Programming 81 (2001) (“Thus, findings of wellfitting hypothesized models, where the χ2 approximates the degrees of freedom,
have proven to be unrealistic in most SEM empirical research.”)
86 Byrne, supra note85, at 81.
87 See André Beauducel & Werner W. Wittmann, Simulation Study on Fit Indexes in

CFA Based on data with Slightly Distorted Simple Structure, 12 Structural Equation Modeling 41, 73 (2005) (concluding that of simulation study that “a model evaluation
strategy that focuses on RMSEA, SRMR, and perhaps the χ2/df values . . . for psychometric research on personality traits and for other areas of psychology”).
88 See Li-tze Hu & Peter M. Bentler, Cutoff Criteria for Fit Indexes in Covariance Struc-

ture Analysis: Conventional Criteria versus New Alternatives, 6 Structural Equation Modeling 1 (1999); Matthew Thomson, Deborah J. MacInnis & C Whan Park, The Ties
That Bind: Measuring the Strength of Consumers' Emotional Attachments to Brands, 15 J.
Consumer Psychol. 77 (2005).
89 Consistent with convention, observed variables are represented by rectangles,

while unobserved or latent variables are represented by ovals. See Weston & Gore,
supra note 79, tbl. 1. The observed variables from which the latent variables are
derived (via factor analysis) are omitted for ease of display. See supra Part II.A.3
(describing measures used to construct latent variables).
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ence of their values on the perceptions of the facts. The model fit the
data adequately under each of the selected fitness indexes.
Independent v.
Democrat

Path Coefficients
Standardized ß’s

Republican v.
Democrat

Sign: +/-

>.5
>.25
>.15
<.15
ns (p ≤ .10)

Conservative v. +
Liberal
Hierarchy v.
Egalitarianism

+

BC_Facts
R2

Individualism v. +
Communitarianism

BC_Acquit

+

R2 = .88

= .25

+

Female
Black
Other
Minority

-

-

Income Education

-

Married

Urban
Fit Statistics: χ2 /df = 4.7
SRMR = .08
RMSEA = .07

Figure 5. “Self-Defensive Cognition” SEM Model in Beleaguered Commuter Condition

The size and significance of the path coefficients (represented in
the form of a multivariate regression Table 2) enable the impact of
various influences on pro-defendant factual perceptions to be disentangled and compared. Consistent with our hypotheses, HierarchyEgalitarianism and Individualism-Communitarianism both inclined
subjects to form a pro-defendant view. Indeed, these variables had
the largest impacts, respectively, of all the influences on factual perceptions. Conservativism also weakly predicted a pro-defendant view
of the facts, but interestingly, party membership did not generate any
significant effect once other influences were controlled for.
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Standardized Beta Weights
Female
Black
Other Minority
Income
Education
Urban
Married
Hierarchy
Individualism
Conservativism
Republican
Independent
R2

.059*
-.108***
-.068**
.000
-.106***
-.036
-.083**
.270***
.172***
.075*
.003
.035
.25

n = 772. *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .10. Dependent variable is BC_Facts.

Table 2. Influences on Pro-Defendant Fact Perceptions in Beleaguered Commuter

After Hierarchy and Individualism, the next biggest impact was
associated with being African-American (rather than white). As expected, this individual characteristic, which can plausibly be seen as
influencing cognition of facts either as a proxy for group-held values
or as a proxy for experiences unrelated to values, negatively influenced subjects’ views of the pro-defendant facts. Gender, another
characteristic that could influence cognition either through its correlation with self-defining values or its correlation with experiences,
weakly predicted a pro-defendant view of the facts.
Two influences that are seemingly unrelated to values also affected perceptions of the facts. One of these was education: the more
educated subjects were (holding all other influences constant), the
more likely they were to form a view of the facts hostile to the defendant’s case. The other was marital status, which likewise (modestly)
inclined subjects toward a pro-conviction view of the facts. Income
had no effect. Nor did residing in an urban community.
Figure 6 depicts a model constructed to test the relationship between variables associated with the Neutral Umpire Model. In it, only
characteristics that arguably exert influence independently of values
are treated as affecting fact perceptions, which are themselves treated
as the only influence on outcome judgments. Precisely because it
takes no account of subjects’ values, this model explains over 60%
less of the variance in subjects’ fact perceptions (R2 = .09) relative to

Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense

47

the previous one (R2 = .25). The model also displayed poor relative
fit (SRMR = .10). Overall, then, for Beleaguered Commuter a model
that reflects Neutral Umpire hypothesis does not supply as convincing an account of the relationships observed in the data as one that
reflects the Self-Defensive Cognition account.
Independent v.
Democrat

Path Coefficients
Standardized ß’s

Republican v.
Democrat

Sign: +/-

>.5
>.25
>.15
<.15
ns (p ≤ .10)

Conservative v.
Liberal
Hierarchy v.
Egalitarianism

Pro-Dfdt Fact
Perceptions
R2 = .09

Individualism v.
Communitarianism
Female
Black
Other
Minority
Income

+

Acquittal
R2 = .88

-

-

Education

Married

Urban

Fit Statistics:

χ2 /df = 4.8
SRMR = .10
RMSEA = .07

Figure 6. “Neutral Umpire” SEM Model in Beleaguered Commuter Condition

The same is true for a model that reflects the relationships posited by the Partisan Value position. As depicted in Figure 7, that
model treats self-defining values (including characteristics with which
such values might correlate) as influencing outcome judgments directly, without mediation by fact perceptions, which are themselves
deemed to have no effect. That model also does not satisfy the specified fix indexes (χ2/df = 5.3; SRMR = .11). Failing to take account of
the influence of subjects’ fact perceptions reduces the power of this
model to explain outcome judgments by over 67% (R2 = .20) relative
to the two previous models (R2 = .88). Interestingly, once the impact
of Hierarchy (ß = .297; p < .001) and Individualism (ß = .142,
p = .02) are taken into account, neither conservative-liberal ideology
(ß = .044, p = .36) nor Republican-Democrat party affiliation (ß = .018, p = .69) has any significant impact on outcome judgments.
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Path Coefficients
Standardized ß’s

Republican v.
Democrat

>.25
>.15
<.15
ns (p ≤ .10)

Sign: +/-

Conservative v.
Liberal
+

Hierarchy v.
Egalitarianism

Acquittal
R2 = .20
+

Individualism v.
Communitarianism

+

Female
Black
Other
Minority

-

Income Education

Married

Urban

Fit Statistics:

χ2 /df = 5.3
SRMR = .11
RMSEA = .07

Figure 7. “Partisan Value” SEM Model in Beleaguered Commuter Condition

As we hypothesized, a model based on the Self-Defensive Cognition position fits the data better than ones based on the Neutral
Umpire and Partisan Value positions. But as is almost always true in
SEM analyses, it remains possible to construct numerous models in
addition to the hypothesized ones that also satisfy the utilized criteria
of fitness. These models, in which values (and characteristics correlating with values) are treated as influencing outcome judgments both
directly and indirectly, essentially involve hybrid combinations of the
Self-Defensive Cognition and Partisan Value positions. Fully testing
our hypotheses requires a comparison of the adequacy of the SelfDefensive Cognition model reflected in Figure 5 and these other
ones. 90
A technique employing the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) was used to perform such a test. BIC is one approach to Bayesian model testing, which computes the odds that any particular model
90 See generally Adrian E. Raftery, Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research, 25 Socio-

logical Methodology 111, 113, 120-21 (1995) (describing as “arbitrary” the common practice of accepting an hypothesized model that adequately fits data without
evaluating it relative to others that also adequately fit and that generate “different
answers to the main questions of interest”).
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better explains the data than another within a specified set of models. 91 BIC uses an algorithm that initially assigns all models an equal
likelihood of being the best fitting and that thereafter updates its estimations in light of the relative fit of each model compared to that of
every other one. 92 In our BIC analysis, we compared the model depicted in Figure 5 to the 255 potential alternative models formed
when the 8 variables representing subjects values (Hierarchy, Individualism, Conservativism, Republican, and Independent, as well as
Black, Other Minority, and Female) were treated as potentially influencing not just factual perceptions but also outcome judgments, either uniquely or in combination with one or more of the others. 93
Independent v.
Democrat

Paths

Posited
Tested

Republican v.
Democrat
Conservative v.
Liberal
Hierarchy v.
Egalitarianism

Pro-Dfdt Fact
Perceptions

Acquittal

Individualism v.
Communitarianism
Female
Black
Other
Minority

Income Education

Married

Urban

Figure 8. Posited Relationships and Tested Alternatives in Beleaguered Commuter BIC
Analysis

This analysis indicated that the model in Figure 5 was the most
likely of the tested models to be the best fitting one. The odds that
that model was the best-fitting were greater than 3:1—the cutoff
91 See Lee, supra note 85, at 113-15, 127-28.
92 See Raftery, supra note 90, at 111, 130-33, 137-38.
93 The total number of possible models when each of the eight value-related variables can be individually included or excluded is 28 or 256.
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conventionally deemed to furnish “positive” proof that the less plausible model should be rejected 94 —for every alternative except one.
That one, which had a BIC score of 1.13 (approximately 2.1:1 against
being a better fit), was identical to the one in Figure 5 except that it
treated the variable “Independent vs. Democrat” as influencing outcome judgments both directly as well as indirectly through its impact
on fact perceptions. The effects associated with this variable were
small (ß = .060, p = .10, for BC_Facts; ß = -.067, p = .02, for
BC_Acquittal). In addition, the signs were opposed to one another.
The meaning of this result is complex: essentially, subjects who described themselves as Democrats were (all else equal) slightly less inclined to have a pro-defendant view of the facts, yet controlling for prodefendant fact perceptions more inclined toward acquittal, than ones who
described themselves as independents. Far from undermining the
proposition that self-defensive cognition explains political division in
the Beleaguered Commuter case, this result suggests that more than
100% of the disposition of Democrats to convict relative to independents is mediated by the influence of being a self-described Democrat on subjects’ values on their cognition of facts. On the whole,
though, it would seem unsound to assign much significance to this
statistical quirk, particularly given that the most meaningful political
divisions in Beleaguered Commuter are between Democrats and Republicans, not Democrats and independents.
b. Battered woman. To analyze the data in the Battered Woman
condition, we again constructed models that would allow us to assess
the relationships among variables of interest associated with the SelfDefensive Cognition, the Neutral Umpire, and the Partisan Value
positions. The models utilized the Battered Woman fact perception
and outcome judgment variables (BW_Facts and BW_Acquittal, respectively) but were otherwise identical to those depicted in Figures
5-7. We again found that the Self-Defensive Cognition model adequately fit the data (χ2/df = 4.7; SRMR = .08; RMSEA = .07). Partisan Value again did not (χ2/df = 5.4; SRMR = .09; RMSEA = .07).
But this time Neutral Umpire also did (χ2/df = 4.7; SRMR = .08;
RMSEA = .07).
Not surprisingly, it was possible to construct various other, nonhypothesized models that combined various elements of these three
that also adequately fit the data. Accordingly, to assess the relative
94 See Raftery, supra note 90, Tbl. 6.
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plausibility of these various models, we again performed a BIC analysis. Models that contemplated various combinations of values influencing outcome judgments either directly or indirectly were again included in the testing set. But this time so were models that contemplated that none of the value measures would have any effect whatsoever on outcome judgments, the relationship asserted by the Neutral Umpire Position. The tested combinations of relationships,
which formed 8,192 discrete models, are reflected in Figure 9.
Independent v.
Democrat

Paths

Posited
Tested

Republican v.
Democrat
Conservative v.
Liberal
Hierarchy v.
Egalitarianism

Pro-Dfdt Fact
Perceptions

Acquittal

Individualism v.
Communitarianism
Female
Black
Other
Minority

Income Education

Married

Urban

Figure 9. Posited Relationships and Tested Alternatives in Battered Woman BIC
Analysis

The model deemed most likely to be the best fitting one is displayed in Figure 10. Inconsistent with the Neutral Umpire position
but consistent with the Self-Defensive Cognition position, variables
unambiguously associated with subjects’ values—namely, the Hierarchy-Egalitarian measure of worldview, and liberalism-conservativism—influence subjects’ positions, and do so indirectly through
their effect on subjects’ pro-defense perception of the facts. These
effects are large, relative to other influences. The IndividualismCommunitarianism dimension of worldview does not affect subjects’
fact perceptions, a result not unexpected, given the ambiguity of the
social meaning of Battered Woman relative to this constellation of
norms. Nor does party affiliation. As expected, gender has a positive
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effect on subjects’ factual perceptions. So does being married. Education has a weak negative effect.
Path Coefficients
Standardized ß’s

Independent v.
Democrat
Republican v.
Democrat
Conservative v.
Liberal

Sign: +/-

> .5
> .10
≤ .10
ns (p ≤ .10)

+

Hierarchy v.
Egalitarianism

-

Pro-Dfdt Fact
Perceptions
R2 = .08

Individualism v.
Communitarianism

Acquittal
R2 = .91

+

+

Female
Black
Other
Minority

-

+

+

Income

Education

Married

Urban
Fit Statistics: χ2 /df = 4.6
SRMR = .08
RMSEA = .07

Figure 10. Most Probable Best-Fitting Model in Battered Woman

Although it posits that fact perceptions strongly explains variation in outcome judgments, the model explains only a modest
amount of the variation in subjects’ fact perceptions (R2 = .08). Its
explanatory power in this regard is about one-third as large of that of
the Beleaguered Commuter in Figure 5 (R2 = .25). Absent a plausible
conjecture as to how any omitted variables might correlate to the observed ones, however, there is no reason to doubt that the model accurately captures the influence of, and relationship between, the variables deemed to influence fact perceptions. 95

95 See Jacob Cohen, Patricia Cohen, Stephen G. West & Leona S. Aiken, Applied
Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences 143 (3rd ed.
2003).
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Standardized Beta Weights
Female
Black
Other Minority
Income
Education
Urban
Married
Hierarchy
Conservativism
R2

.060*
-.018
.064*
-.045
-.067*
-.025
.092**
-.143***
-.109**
.08

n = 838. *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .10. Dependent variable is
BW_Facts.

Table 3. Influences on Pro-Defendant Fact Perceptions in Battered Womanr

In this model, the Hierarchy-Egalitarian dimension of worldview
also has a small and significant direct effect (ß = .060, p = .02) on outcome judgments. This relationship would appear more in keeping
with the Partisan Value position than with the Self-Defensive Cognition one. But this appearance is misleading.
The sign of the direct effect of Hierarchy on outcome judgments
is positive, the opposite of the larger (ß = -.140, p = .00) indirect effect
of Hierarchy on pro-defendant fact perceptions. In other words, being hierarchical, as expected, influences subjects to adopt an antidefendant view of the facts in Battered Woman. It also inclines them
to favor acquittal when factual perceptions are held constant, but this result
is merely a statistical artifact of the immense size of the mediating
effect of fact perceptions on hierarchs’ and egalitarians’ positions on
the Battered Woman case. In effect, the overall effect of a hierarchical orientation on the disposition to convict the defendant is so
strongly concentrated on the impact of values on subjects’ fact perceptions that the mediated effect of worldviews explains more than
100% of the overall variance in the disposition of Egalitarians and
Hierarchs to acquit her.
Only one other model tested in the BIC analysis survived the 3:1
cutoff criterion for positive proof of inadequacy. That model, which
had a BIC score of .768 (odds of approximately 9:8 against being superior to the model depicted in Figure 10), was identical to the one
depicted in Figure 10 except that it posited a direct effect between the
Individualism-Solidarism and outcome judgments. That effect was
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small and insignificant (ß = -.035, p = .29). The potential superior
fitness of this model, then, furnishes no meaningful basis for questioning the basic results of the model depicted in Figure 10.
C. Discussion
1. Summary of Results
The aim of the study was to examine a set of hypotheses supportive of the larger proposition that self-defensive cognition, not
partisan disregard of facts and controlling law, explain political conflict over self-defense cases. The results of the study strongly supported these hypotheses.
First, we found, not surprisingly, that cases patterned on the
iconic battered woman and beleaguered commuter do divide people
of diverse values. The divisions, moreover, form mirror images of
each other. In the beleaguered commuter case, persons of egalitarian
and communitarian worldviews, and persons who describe themselves as liberals or Democrats, are more likely to convict than persons of hierarchical and individualist views, and those who describe
themselves as conservatives or Republicans. In the battered woman
case, the positions of these sets of persons is reversed.
Second, we found that the influence that values exert over outcome judgments is mediated by the impact of the commitments on
individuals’ perceptions of the facts. Consistent with the selfdefensive cognition hypothesis, the data showed that subjects of differing values formed opposing views of the key facts (which were
structured to be largely parallel in both cases). The proposition that
subjects would favor outcomes that fit their values independently of
their view of the key facts not supported by the evidence. SEM models that treated values as influencing outcome judgments directly, independently of their influence on fact perceptions, failed to fit the data.
Models that posited that values could simultaneously influence perceptions of facts and outcome judgments suggested that holding fact perceptions constant persons of particular commitments were inclined to
decide cases in the manner that was contrary to the positions associated with their values—an anomaly that only confirms how decisive
the contribution of varying fact perceptions is to the political conflict
actually observed in such cases.
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Not surprisingly—or unexpectedly—values turned out not to be
the only influence on our subjects’ fact perceptions. Two others that
did—race and gender—are themselves recognized to be correlated
with values (cultural, moral, and otherwise) that are essential to individual identity. But at least two other characteristics that mattered—
level of education and marital status—would seem to be connected
to value-independent experiences that influence the sorts of understandings people might use to assess the plausibility of competing
factual claims in the battered woman and beleaguered commuter
cases. But none of these individual characteristics had as strong a bearing on subjects’ factual perceptions as the values did.
Third and finally, we found that cultural worldviews—a species
of value that is known to motivate identity-protective cognition—
made a relatively large contribution to variance in our subjects’ factual perceptions. This was especially true in Beleaguered Commuter,
where Hierarchy-Egalitarianism and Individualism-Communitarianism were the two largest fact-perception influences.
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism, but not Individualism-Communitarianism, affected fact-perceptions in Battered Woman, once all
other influences were controlled for. This was not totally unexpected,
since we were unable to form an unequivocal hypothesis about how
the Individualism-Communitarianism dimension of worldview would
dispose subjects to view the actors involved.
The impact of conventional political commitments was mixed.
Political party affiliation made no significant contribution to variance
in fact perceptions in Beleaguered Commuter once other influences
were controlled for, and did not figure in the best-fitting models in
Battered Woman. Liberal-conservative ideology made a significant
but very modest contribution in Beleaguered Commuter after cultural
worldviews were taken into account. However, in Battered Woman,
liberal-conservative ideology had a bigger impact, one that approached that of Hierarchy-Egalitarianism. The performance of liberal-conservative ideology in the analyses bears on the question of
how important ideology is relative to culture in orienting individuals’
understanding of how the world works. 96 But because it is not disputed that political ideology can be a source of values essential to individual identity, the contribution that liberal-conservative ideology
96 See generally Wildavsky, supra note 78; Braman et al., supra note 78.
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made in this case is perfectly consistent with—indeed unambiguously
supportive of—our primary claim: that self-defensive cognition is the
source of political conflict over self-defense cases.
2. Issues for Future Research
a. The missing link. The study examined the connection between
people’s values and their reactions to certain types of self-defense
cases. Our conclusion was that persons aren’t ignoring facts at odds
with their preferred outcomes; rather they are psychologically motivated to conform their view of the facts to the outcomes most in
keeping with their values.
It should be possible, though, to refine and enrich this picture of
how values enter into cognition of facts. Self-defensive cognition
posits that individuals are drawn (subconsciously) to facts supportive
of their values, particularly ones connected to group commitments.
But some process must also be occurring that enables subjects to recognize what those facts are.
One might suspect that subjects are first identifying what result
they prefer on the basis of their values and then subconsciously
working backward, as it were, to identify and find support for the
facts that cohere with that outcome. Because it accepts that individuals end up honestly believing that the outcome they support is dictated by facts independent of their values, this “confirmation bias” 97
thesis would move persons of diverse values to disagree on politically
controversial cases in patterns consistent with those of self-defensive
cognition thesis.
Nevertheless, we suspect the confirmation bias does not accurately capture the psychological experience of persons evaluating selfdefense cases like the ones featured in this study. That is, we doubt
that persons self-consciously identify the outcome they prefer before
they look at the facts in the case; we imagine, at least, that they perceive themselves to be deferring an outcome judgment until after they
have consulted the facts in a manner that comports with neutral decisionmaking. If so, then something other than a “peek” at the result

97 See generally C. R. Mynatt, M. E. Doherty & R. D. Tweney, Confirmation Bias in a

Simulated Research Environment--Experimental-Study of Scientific Inference, 29 Q.J. Exp
Psychol. 85 (1977).
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must nevertheless be making them converge on facts congenial to
their values. What might that other influence be?
We can think of two related ones. The first is social meaning. The
Battered Woman and Beleaguered Commuter vignettes likely evoke
competing sets of culturally resonant symbols—of the historic denigration of social prerogatives within the home; of heroic opposition
to entrenched forms of patriarchy; of the breakdown of legitimate
social order and a righteous attempt to reverse the same; of the imposition of racial dominance; of virtuous self-reliance; of the disparagement of nonviolent, reasoned self-governance. Which of these
symbols the fact patterns evoke in individuals and their evaluation of
them—matters strongly conditioned by individuals’ self-defining values—dispose individuals to adopt corresponding views of the facts. 98
Another possible link between values and fact perceptions is affect. Contemporary work in psychology and neuro-science suggests
that emotions play a critical role—a preverbal one, not reproducible
by reflective or deductive reasoning—in enabling individuals to perceive what states of affairs, and what stances toward them, best express their values. 99 Mark Alicke, the originator of the “culpable control” model of blame attribution, posits that affective responses to
norm-violative behavior guide individuals’ cognition of the existence
of factual predicates of blame. 100 Work on the cultural cognition of
risk suggest that affective judgments enable the same expressively
rational stance taking when individuals form factual judgments about
putatively dangerous activities. 101 It seems plausible that individuals
who encounter facts like those in the Battered Woman and Belea98 See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on

Political Beliefs, 85 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 808 (2003) (finding support for mediating influence of social meanings on effects of in-group affinity on belief formation).
99 See generally Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the

Human Brain (1994); Martha Craven Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions (2001).
100 See Alicke, supra note 51, at 558.
101 See Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, Penn. L. Rev.

(forthcoming 2008); Ellen M. Peters, Burt Burraston & C. K. Mertz, An EmotionBased Model of Risk Perception and Stigma Susceptibility: Cognitive Appraisals of Emotion,
Affective Reactivity, Worldviews, and Risk Perceptions in the Generation of Technological
Stigma, 24 Risk Analysis 1349 (2004).
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guered Commuter vignette are likewise forming affective judgments,
themselves conditioned by their values, that guide them to adopt
views of the facts that best express their defining commitments.
Indeed, social meaning and affect might well work in tandem.
That is, the immediate symbolic connotations that such cases evoke
in persons of diverse values themselves trigger or become the objects
of emotions that then dispose individuals toward value-supportive
views of the facts.
These hypotheses, too, are worthy of study. Appropriately designed experiments could assess what contribution, if any, confirmation bias, social meaning, and affect play within the perception of
facts in controversial self-defense cases. Such studies would not only
help to validate, and extend understanding of, the function of selfdefensive cognition in this setting. It might also furnish insights on
forms of structuring information about such cases that counteracts
the influence of self-defensive cognition—assuming counteracting it
is in fact an appropriate end. 102
b. Deliberation. Each subject in our study assessed on her own the
facts of the self-defense case that she was assigned to decide. In the
real world, individuals tend to evaluate facts like these in groups,
whether as members of juries deciding cases or citizens debating
whether jury verdicts are sound. Adding elements of deliberation
would be a worthwhile way to extend the research carried out in our
study.
In fact, the impact of deliberation on legal and political decisionmaking has already been subject to extensive assessment. Certain
forms of highly structured group discussion appear sometimes to
mute disagreements on policy matters. 103 But most forms of deliberation, including ones that occur in real-world legal settings, have
exactly the opposite effect. The phenomenon of “group polarization”
refers to the tendency of individuals to adopt progressively more extreme views as they exchange views on disputed issues. 104 The effect
is particularly acute when members of diverse groups deliberate, re102 See text at notes 139-140.
103 See Bruce A. Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day (2004).
104 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. Pol. Phil. 175
(2002)..
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sulting, typically, in highly uniform views within such groups and
highly opposed ones across them. 105
It’s unlikely that a study of deliberation in politically controversial self-defense cases would generate different results. Nevertheless,
adding deliberation to a study like the one we performed could profitably be used to examine at least two issues.
One would be the comparative effects of deliberation on jury
verdicts, on the one hand, and public reactions to jury verdicts, on
the other. Left to their own devices, individuals tend to expose themselves to information sources (whether media outlets, authority figures, or peers) that share their own cultural and ideological outlooks. 106 This disposition can be expected systematically to magnify
political and cultural polarization. Jurors, in contrast, discuss matters
in relatively small groups whose membership they cannot influence;
individuals deliberating under such circumstances continue to migrate
toward extremes, 107 but the orienting signal of culture or ideology is
necessarily diluted for them. It’s conceivable that this effect explains
why juries, even relatively diverse ones, might converge with relative
ease on unanimous verdicts that nevertheless generate intense political divisions in the public at large. Such a finding would be relevant
to assessing the often-asserted importance of juries in gaining acceptability for or “legitimizing” potentially controversial outcomes.
Including deliberation in the study of controversial self-defense
cases would also allow investigation of potential responses to the effects of self-defensive cognition. Empirical work in other settings has
suggested techniques that can mitigate the disposition of individuals
to resist information that threatens their values. 108 If mitigation of
the effects of self-defensive cognition is deemed socially desirable,
experimental studies could be designed to determine how that objec105 See generally See generally David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, What

Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 915 (2007) (demonstrating effect experimentally); Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelmann, Modeling
Facts, Culture, and Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 Soc. J. Res. 283-304 (2005) (simulations of this effect).
106 See id.
107 See Sunstein, supra note 104.
108 See Cohen, et al. Partisan Divide,” , supra note 3; Cohen, et al., Affirming the Self,
supra note 3.
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tive might be pursued, both in the jury room and in the town square.
Whether society ought to view self-defensive cognition as a phenomenon worthy of neutralization in the resolution and evaluation of controversial criminal cases, and if so what sorts of interventions might
have that effect, are matters we take up in the next Part of this paper.

III. THE SELF-DEFENSIVE COGNITION OF SELFDEFENSE: AN APPRAISAL
Our study considered the wide-spread perception that partisan
values account for popular controversy over self-defense cases. They
do, our results suggest, but in a way that defies the dominant academic versions of this claim. There’s every reason to believe that citizens of diverse moral and cultural persuasions are faithfully applying
the doctrine; it’s the unperceived cognitive impact of their values on
their cognition of the facts that induces them to disagree on what
those criteria entail in particular cases.
We now want to consider the moral and practical significance of
the self-defensive cognition of self-defense. Is the influence of individuals self-defining values on their perceptions of facts in selfdefense cases something to be concerned about? If so, what, if anything, can be done?
A. Is There a Problem? Self-Defensive Cognition Meets Cognitive Illiberalism
As we’ve discussed, both popular and scholarly debate over selfdefense has been consumed with the conflict between the Neutral
Umpire and Partisan Value Models. Abuse-excuse critics lament the
subversion of the former by the latter. New Normativists complain
only about the reluctance of decisionmakers and commentators to
acknowledge the dominance of the Partisan Value position so that
members of the public can see and react to the contribution contested visions of the good can make to the law. 109
We can imagine how those on both sides of this dispute might
in fact welcome the finding that self-defensive cognition is at work in
controversial self-defense cases. Abuse-excuse critics—or at least
those who are dismayed by their indictment of the law—might be
relieved to learn that citizens (legal decisionmakers and those who
react to what decisionmakers have done) aren’t in fact putting their
109 See supra text at notes 36-50.
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partisan commitments ahead of the law’s impartial commands but
instead are judging based on their honest perception of the facts. To
be sure, citizens of diverse values disagree about the facts. But honest
disagreements of fact are hardly extraordinary and aren’t normally
understood to pose a threat to the law’s legitimacy. It’s enough, one
might think, that citizens, sincerely try to be impartial; no sensible
conception of neutrality in law could require that impartially motivated citizens always come to the same conclusions.
New Normativists might also take heart in the contribution of
self-defensive cognition to disputes over self-defense. They perceive
in the law’s focus on facts (ones relating dangerousness, volition, and
the like) a design to conceal the impact of partisan values. But the phenomenon of self-defensive cognition complicates the fact-value distinction. Citizens who react to media and other popular depictions of
battered women and beleaguered commuter cases (not to mention
law students who react to judicial opinions featuring them) can only
speculate about what was going on in the minds of the parties involved or what would have transpired had the defendant not resorted
to deadly force. Even jurors who sit in judgment in such cases have
no direct access to evidence of such matters. Individuals draw on
their own common sense to form judgments on these issues; yet it
turns out their sense of how the world works turns primarily on
shared understandings of how it should. Charting the impact of selfdefensive cognition promotes the New Normativist agenda of moral
transparency by revealing factual conflict to be just another way we
contest competing understanding of the good life through law.
But we are much less sanguine. The basis of our anxiety about
self-defensive cognition is the phenomenon of cognitive illiberalism. 110
Cognitive illiberalism refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their perceptions of how risky or harmful putatively dangerous
behavior is to their cultural or moral evaluations of that behavior. It
can be viewed as a distinctive bias in moral reasoning for persons who
believe the law should eschew the enforcement of a partisan moral
orthodoxy and confine itself to the promotion of secular ends agreeable to persons of diverse moral and cultural persuasions. 111

110 See Kahan, supra note 5.
111 See id.
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We think the possible reactions we’ve attributed to abuse-excuse
critics and New Normativists fail to recognize that the self-defensive
cognition is, in this context at least, a species of cognitive illiberalism.
By way of response to these positions, we’ll present two points that
reflect this theme. One relates to how self-defensive cognition likely
disappoints the ends of individuals who desire to judge impartially,
and the other to how this phenomenon defeats society’s ends in
reaching legitimate outcomes in self-defense cases that respect the
cultural and moral identities of its citizens.
1. Individual Judgments: Values or Blunders?
The normative status of beliefs formed through self-defensive
cognition is a complicated issue. Those beliefs are factual in nature
and relate, typically, to personal and societal dangers (the impact of
climate change, the hazards of gun ownership, the effects of illegal
drug distribution, etc.). They derive, however, from individuals’ defining values, which motivate them to resolve factual ambiguities in a
way that supports conclusions favorable to activities and social roles
vital to their identities. 112 Of course, the idea that reality is as one
wishes it to be is not a very reliable guide for action; it can indeed be
viewed as a form of cognitive error. 113 For that reason, one might
conclude there is little reason for persons who hold such beliefs,
much less others they have entrusted to make decisions about how
best to secure their safety and well-being, to view them as worthy of
any particular deference or respect. 114
While not simply wrong, this account is, in our view, too simple.
Self-defensive cognition, like dynamics of cultural cognition generally,
is not perfectly analogous to, say, “base rate neglect,” “overgeneralization,” “extremeness aversion,” “the gamblers fallacy,” and various
other forms of cognitive bias. 115 These dynamics are manifestations
112 Kahan et al., supra note 59.
113 See Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions 20-21

(1999) (describing how “wishful thinking” borne of cognitive-dissonance avoidance can “lead[] to false beliefs about the world, . . . [the] acting [on which] can
have bad consequences”).
114 See Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110, 1111 (2006)

(making this argument about factual beliefs that arise from cultural cognition).
115 See generally Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, & Paul Slovic eds., 1982).
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of “bounded rationality”; they reflect ubiquitous limits on the power
of individuals to process information in a way that promotes their
well-being. 116 Individuals don’t identify with these constraints on
their computational acumen; they regret them. As a result, they might
indeed welcome the intervention of others—perhaps expert risk
regulators—who posses the training, technology, and resources necessary to make decisions undistorted by these influences. Selfdefensive cognition, in contrast, is a product of our attachment to
our most deeply held values. Whatever their influence on our cognition, we would never disown them; they are integral to our sense of
who we are. When an expert regulator or another acting on our behalf decides to afford no weight to such beliefs, she is necessarily
leaving out of her decisionmaking framework a vital element of our
agency. 117
But that doesn’t mean, we’d argue, that beliefs that are the product of self-defensive cognition should invariably be viewed as normative for our decisions or the decisions of those who represent us. Action based on those beliefs, if they are in error, might have noxious
consequences that the person holding those beliefs would herself
view as unacceptable. In addition, indulging those beliefs just because
they derive from values might offend other values the person holds,
including ones that relate to whether the sorts of values that have given
rise to the belief in question are proper sources of guidance for
law. 118
To sort out these complexities, we’d propose that the entitlement of such beliefs to moral respect be tested by asking this question: If the person who held such belief could be shown that it arises
from self-defensive cognition, how would she feel about it? Again, a
person who could be shown she’d made a computational error based
on some dynamic of bounded rationality would repudiate any conclusion that follows from it. She might not do the same, however, for a
belief that arises from her self-defining values. Cultural individualists,
for example, tend to believe that private gun ownership reduces
116 See generally Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral

Economics, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1449 (2003).
117 See Kahan et al., supra note 58, at 1104-06.
118 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural Evaluations of Risk: “Values” or

“Blunders”?, 119 Harv. L. Rev. F. 1110 (2006) (developing this argument)
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rather than increases crime. 119 But if they learned that their disposition to believe this proposition had been influenced by the cultural
value they attach to guns and the stake they have in occupying social
roles that involving owing one, it seems unlikely they would assent
immediately to a hand gun ban. 120 On the contrary, they might be
relieved to learn that they can rely on their values (likely through the
mediating influence of emotion 121 ) to identify the position an uncertain factual question that best expresses their cultural commitments. Or
they might see the cultural values (self-reliance, individual courage,
freedom, and the like) that motivated them to form that belief as justifying gun rights whatever the impact of gun ownership might be.
The critical issue, then, is whether individuals who could be
shown that their self-defining values had shaped their view of the
facts in cases like Battered Woman and Beleaguered Commuter
would be similarly unshaken in their conclusions about how those
cases should be decided. We think the answer is no. On the contrary,
we think they would view it as the distinctive form of bias in moral
reasoning characteristic of cognitive illiberalism.
Our position here is based on a mixture of informed speculation
about how people do feel about the relationship between their values
and self-defense cases and our own moral view about how they
should. Our fundamental premise is that most citizens are not (and
should not be) moral imperialists. They have views—deeply held
ones—about the nature of the good life. But they by and large accept
(as they ought to) the fundamental tenet of political liberalism that
the law should not force their view of the good on others, who
should be free (subject to laws necessary to secure equal liberty for
all) to pursue their own understanding of the best way to live. 122
Such individuals, we believe, would perceive that the actors involved
119 See Kahan et al., supra note 59.
120 Cf. Cultural Cognition Project, What Matters More--Consequences or Meanings?,

http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task=view
&id=104 (reporting finding that 87% of Americans who oppose stronger gun control laws agree with proposition that “[e]ven if banning handguns would greatly
reduce crime, it would be wrong for society to forbid law-abiding people from
owning guns for self-protection.”).
121 See Kahan, supra note 101.
122 See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 31-32 (1971); John Stuart Mill, On

Liberty, 14 (D. Spitz ed., 1975).
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in controversial self-defense cases—the putative aggressors and the
putative defenders, alike—are often involved in patterns of living that
variously gratify and offend contested views of the good life. But they
would not believe it was appropriate to condition the right to defend
oneself through violence, or to be protected from violence not reasonably necessary for another’s self-defense, to depend on their own
particular view. If they believed that, we would have found that that
Partisan Value Model best explained the results in our study. Instead,
such individuals would desire to decide such cases according to criteria—the very ones reflect in the dominant doctrine of self-defense—
that make the privilege to defend and the entitled to be protected
available to all regardless of their cultural or social identities. That’s
why we found that individuals of all cultural and political persuasions
do conform their outcome judgments to their perceptions of the facts
in cases likes Battered Woman and Beleaguered Commuter.
We think persons who see the task of judging in controversial
self-defense cases this way would be profoundly disappointed to
learn that what they perceive the facts to be is itself a product of their
partisan values. They would not adopt the view—attributed to us at
the outset to the relieved abuse-excuse critic—that honest efforts at
impartiality are sufficient to quiet the anxiety of partisan bias in the
law. These people (our subjects, as we interpret the data from our
study) want to be neutral umpires; they would be no more heartened
to learn that their partisan values were exerting secret control over
their perceptions of the facts than would a real baseball umpire to
learn that his rooting interest for a particular team was subconsciously subverting his goal to call a fair game. Nor would these individuals accept the advice of our imagined New Normativist. They
would not want to be told openly to embrace the values expressed by
their perception of the facts; they want to be told how, given their
commitment to the law’s own humanist aspirations, they can learn to
see the facts in a way that isn’t just a disguised reflection of their vision of the ideal society.
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2. Collective Judgments: Accuracy, Legitimacy, and Illiberal Status
Competition
Whether or not baseball can handle variance in strike zones
across umpires, 123 it’s clear that what we have called the Neutral
Umpire Model can tolerate at least some forms of variance in factual
perceptions among self-defense decisionmakers. The effect and
weight a legal decisionmakers affords to evidence depends on general
understandings about how the world works, and those understandings are certain to vary based on all manner of experience—
education, sociodemographic background, significant personal
events, and the like. Knowing that jurors perceive facts differently
based on the diversity of their backgrounds doesn’t undermine our
confidence in verdicts. On the contrary, reliance on the jury helps (it
is thought) to legitimize verdicts by assuring that the law’s perception
of facts reflects exactly this diversity in popular understandings of the
workings of the world. 124
The reaction we attributed to the relieved abuse-excuse critic
presupposes that conflicting fact perceptions that originate in diverse
values can be accommodated by the Neutral Umpire Model in exactly
the same way. In our view, this is not the case.
To start, whereas the contribution that diverse life experiences
make to factual perceptions arguably enhances rational decisionmaking, the contribution made by self-defensive cognition seems to subvert it. A rational decisionmaker will necessarily draw on all the information her experiences afford her. She’ll also revise her beliefs in
light of new experiences, including exposure to other persons who
have different backgrounds and hence different interpretations of
ambiguous evidence. 125 This is not how individuals reason when they
are laboring under the influence of self-defensive cognition, however.
123 See Nick Cafardo, Ortiz: It’s No Ball Figuring out What Is a Strike, Boston Globe,

Apr. 6, 2006, at D13 (“With the help of Red Sox video coordinator Billy Broadbent, Ortiz put together a video of all the pitches he took for strikes last season,
and he said he was stunned by some of the pitches umpires called strikes, some of
which the designated hitter claims were way out of the zone.”).
124 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529-30 (1975) (“the requirement of a

jury’s being chosen from a fair cross section of the community” enables the jury to
promotes “public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system”).
125 See generally Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on

Choices Under Uncertainty (1968).

Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense

67

In that situation, they selectively attend to information based on its
congeniality to identity-affirming beliefs and construe ambiguous
evidence in a way that confirms their identity-affirming priors. They
also reject as non-credible information that unequivocally threatens
those beliefs, particularly when they come from people they perceive
as holding contrary values or group identities. 126 As a result, differences of factual perceptions founded on diversity of values would
seem to pose a much greater threat to accuracy in outcome judgments
than differences founded in diversity of life experiences.
Equally important, differences in such perceptions would also
pose a much bigger threat to the law’s legitimacy. The political acceptability of law depends on its power to assure disparately situated
citizens that the law’s judgments have been arrived at in a way that
takes their interests and identities into account. There seems little reason to believe that differences in factual beliefs founded on citizens’
diverse backgrounds will erode that power, particularly given the existence of institutions—like juries and popularly elected legislatures—
designed (it’s thought) to pool and aggregate the insights furnished by
citizens’ collective experiences. 127
But factual disagreements based on self-defensive cognition are
another matter. Those sorts of disagreements, again, are much more
likely to survive, and even deepen, over the course of deliberation. 128
What’s more, precisely because such beliefs bear such an intimate connection to citizens’ identities, the law is much more likely to
inflict a deep sense of resentment and alienation in the losers when it
picks sides on these issues than it does when it take a position on
other types of facts citizens disagree with. The reason has to do with
126 See Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in Barriers
to Conflict Resolution 27 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
127 On juries, see, for example, Jeffrey Abramson, We the Jury: The Jury System
and the Ideal of Democracy 11 (1994) (“Long ago, Aristotle suggested that democracy's chief virtue was the way it permitted ordinary persons drawn from different
walks of life to achieve a ‘collective wisdom’ that none could achieve alone. At its
best, the jury is the last, best refuge of this connection among democracy, deliberation, and the achievement of wisdom by ordinary persons.”). On legislatures, see,
for example, John Gastil, By Popular Demand 113 (2000) (defending “deliberative
discussion” as “creat[ing] more educated and active citizens and reveal[ing] popular
and effective solutions to pressing national and local problems”).
128 See supra notes 104-105.

Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense

68

another psychological dynamic: naïve realism. Ordinary people, social
psychologists have documented, can readily perceive that the factual
beliefs of their opponents in political debate derive from the congeniality of those beliefs with the latter’s’ self-defining values and group
commitments. In this sense, ordinary people are realists. What makes
them simultaneously naïve is their inability to detect that their own factual beliefs have the same source. 129 Because it induces reciprocal
charges of stupidity and dishonesty, naïve realism generates an atmosphere of distrust, which reinforces the disposition of citizens to
accept the arguments of persons who hold cultural allegiances different from their own. It also heightens everyone’s sense of identitythreat: in a deliberative climate in which citizens are conspicuously
divided along cultural and moral lines, and in which each insists the
others’ position is the product of bad-faith or lack of reason, citizens
of all persuasions converge on the understanding that what’s being adjudicated is not merely an issue of fact, but rather the relative social
competence and status of those who hold competing sets of defining
values. 130
This distinctive form of status competition between groups of
contending worldviews is in fact endemic in our political life. The real
“culture wars” in the United States are not over values but over facts.
Polls show that most citizens actually care less about highly charged
cultural issues like gay marriage or the pledge of allegiance than about
straightforward instrumental ones relating to their health, safety, and
economic well-being. 131 Nevertheless, the latter types of issues inevitably turn on disputed facts—is the climate heating up and are humans the source? do gun control laws increase crime or reduce it?
does the minimum wage raise the standard of living of poor Americans are increase unemployment? will vaccinating young girls for
HPV actually undermine their health by inducing them to engage in
unprotected sex and thus contract HIV?— on which peoples’ positions are conspicuously associated with holding one or another competing set of cultural values. 132 Through the self-reinforcing interac129 See Robinson et al., supra note 6.
130 See Kahan, supra note 5.
131 See generally Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams & Jeremy C. Pope, Culture

War? The Myth of a Polarized America (2005).
132 See Kahan, supra note 5. See generally Wildavsky, supra note 78.
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tion of naïve realism and identity threat, seemingly instrumental policy debates transmute into bitter contests to capture the expressive
power of law to affirm the status and virtue of one culturally defined
group over its adversaries. This is the central collective pathology of
cognitive illiberalism. 133
This pathology extends to the adjudication of cases like those of
the battered woman and the beleaguered commuter. As a result of
self-defensive cognition, we adopt the view of the facts in such caes
that affirms our identities. As a result of naïve realism, we react with
incredulity to professed opposing beliefs of persons who we know
hold alternative values—and with resentment toward the incredulity
those persons profess toward our beliefs. 134 In the face of these reciprocal recriminations, we and they inevitably come to share the understanding that what’s being adjudicated, at least in the court of public opinion, is not merely the “facts” of particular cases but the honesty, intelligence, virtue, and ultimately the status of groups of persons defined by their commitment to particular views of the good.
It’s precisely the amenability of controversial cases to this interpretation that makes them so conspicuous and controversial.
In the end, we do not disagree at all with the New Normativist
who draws the conclusion from self-defensive cognition that fact
claims are just another of the idioms citizens use to contest the nature
of the good life through law. We only dispute, as a descriptive matter,
that this is what they really want and, as a moral matter, that, as citizens of a liberal democracy, they really should.
133 See Kahan, supra note 5.
134 In an insightful recent article, Suzanne Goldberg convincingly argues that fac-

tual claims are used to contest the status of social groups in constitutional law. See
Suzanne Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and FactBased Adjudication, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (2006). Goldberg suggests that the use
of empirical claims in that setting is strategic, enabling judges to conceal reliance on
partisan norms. The results of our experiment suggest that this phenomenon might
have a cognitive source: as a result of self-defensive cognition, judges are disposed
to credit or discredit empirical rationalizations for contested laws depending on
whether those claims cohere with the judges’ cultural orientations. Consistent with
naïve realism, moreover, judges can be expected to denounce fellow jurists who
disagree with them for “departing from [their] role . . . as neutral” arbiters and
“tak[ing] sides in the culture war,” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting), without appreciating how their own judgments are shaped by
their own cultural commitments.
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B. What to Do?
As difficult as it is to unearth the influence of self-defensive
cognition on perceptions of self-defense, and as challenging as assessing its normative implications might be, identifying an effective
means for counteracting this dynamic is all the more daunting. There is
one prescriptive strategy—judgmental exhortation—that we are sure
does not work. In explaining why, we’ll derive some lessons that help
to identify another—charity and affirmation—that might.
1. Against Exhortation and Excoriation
Obviously, exhorting citizens (in their capacities as jurors or as
interested observers) to be “fair minded” and “nonpartisan” in their
judgments won’t work. The reason isn’t that citizens won’t take heed
of such an admonition; it’s that they already are doing just that: selfdefensive cognition generates division among culturally diverse citizens despite their genuine attempts to be even handed in appraising
the facts of self-defense cases.
Indeed, we would go further. Moralizing exhortations not only
aren’t a solution to the problem that self-defensive cognition creates
in self-defense cases; they are part of the problem.
In effect, prominent commentators have been aggressively pursuing the exhortation strategy for years. Abuse-excuse critics implore
defenders of the “battered woman defense” and related doctrines to
cease putting “empathy for some group of disadvantaged defendants” ahead of “neutral principles of law.” 135 New Normativists
answer by demanding that the abuse-excuse critics acknowledge that
their view of law is not neutral but deeply partisan: invoking the supreme value of life to deny only the battered woman a defense while
permitting cuckolds, true men, and other members of historically advantaged groups 136 to protect their “honor and dignity” through resort to deadly violence “betrays either extreme confusion or hypocrisy.” 137
This is a form of debate that both reflects and reinforces the impact of self-defensive cognition and naïve realism on political dis135 Wilson, supra note 32, at 111, 112.
136 See Nourse, supra note 36, at 1455.
137 Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 333.
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course. Each side perceives that the other’s factual beliefs and interpretations of law are shaped, either consciously or subconsciously, by
their commitment to partisan norms, yet don’t recognize—or at least
don’t recognize fully—that the norms they are committed to have the
same impact on their own beliefs and views about the law. As a result, each charges the other with either inability or unwillingness to
use reason, and each bristles indignantly at the very same accusation
when made against it. The basic structure of the debate is identical to
the ones over climate change, gun control, smoking, economic policy
and countless others in which opposing cultural and ideological factions mobilize to fight one another not over the content of their values but over the accuracy of fact perceptions that shaped by their respective values. 138 Precisely because these competing views fact are
so conspicuously aligned with the cultural identities of the citizens
who hold them, moreover, both sides come to see the outcome as a
referendum on the competence and status of their own group. And
that reaction itself ultimately strengthens the self-defensive motivation of individuals to dismiss any evidence that their own view of the
facts might be wrong.
2. For Affirmation and Charity
We’ve suggested that the self-defensive cognition of self-defense
is in large part constructed by a deliberative climate that makes resolution of disputed factual questions a status contest between competing
culturally and ideologically defined groups. The key to counteracting
self-defensive cognition, then, is to create a climate that divests resolution of those factual questions of that public meaning. Without suggesting that it is certain to succeed or to succeed fully, we will describe a strategy that seeks to achieve that end.
The foundation for the strategy is a psychological mechanism
known as identity affirmation. In a series of studies, the psychologist
Geoffrey Cohen and his collaborators have shown that the effect of
self-defensive cognition can be neutralized when individuals are first
exposed to personally affirming experience such as a high test score
or information on some desirable skill or trait they possess. The
boost in self-esteem an affirmed person experiences effectively buffers the identity threat that she would otherwise experience when confronted with information that challenges beliefs connected supportive
138 See Kahan, supra note 5.

Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense

72

of her values and group commitments. Accordingly, that person
doesn’t experience the impulse to reject such information. Cohen and
his associates have shown that identity-affirmation promotes openmindedness and potential changes in position on various controversial issues—from the death penalty to abortion to American policy in
the Middle East—that have in the past been shown to trigger selfdefensive cognition. 139
One potential direct application of identity affirmation would be
to jury decisionmaking. In a case in which a judge anticipated factual
disputes of the sort that tend to provoke self-defensive cognition, he
or she could have jurors engage in one of the self-affirmation exercises shown to be effective in Cohen’s studies. 140 Jurors might then
be expected to give more open-minded consideration to evidence
that challenges their identity-supportive beliefs and to react with
greater receptivity to arguments advanced in deliberations by jurors
of potentially competing cultural persuasions.
Even if it worked, however, such a procedure would have only a
limited impact on the problem of the self-defensive cognition of selfdefense. As we have emphasized, the location of that problem is not
so much the jury room as the virtual town square. Jurors, for whatever reason, seem to reach agreement in battered women, beleaguered commuter and similar cases. It’s the culturally and ideologically polarized reaction of public to verdicts in those cases that creates the perception of widespread partisanship, either on the part of
jurors who decide the cases, members of the public who won’t accept
the outcomes in particular ones of them, or both.
Elsewhere, we have described political analogs of identityaffirmation designed to defuse self-defensive cognition and other
elements of cognitive illiberalism in political discourse generally. 141
“Expressive overdetermination” is a technique for framing policies
139 See articles cited in note 3, supra.
140 Jurors, for example, could be instructed to write essays relating “three or four

personal experiences in which their most highly rated characteristic [as disclosed in
a previous questionnaire] had made them feel good about them selves.” Cohen,
Aronson & Steele, supra note 3, at 1153. Perhaps appellate judges, too, should be
required to engage in such exercises. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Are Judges Political?: An
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (2006) (finding that appellate judges
sitting in multi-judge panels are prone to polarize on ideological grounds).
141 See Kahan, supra note 5; Kahan, et al., supra note 58, at 1097-1100.
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that make them resonate simultaneously with, and thus affirm, a
range of diverse and competing cultural orientations. The use of tradable emissions permits in the Clean Air Act is an example. By showing that air pollution could be solved with a market mechanism—an
outcome affirming to Individualists—the Act made accepting evidence that industrial emissions damage the environment less threatening to persons of that persuasion. At the same time, its recognition
of the need to address the environmental damage associated with
commerce affirmed Egalitarians, making it less threatening for them
to accept the mounting evidence that “command and control” forms
of regulation were in fact ineffective. As they converged on a shared
policy, moreover, the cycle of recrimination associated with naïve
realism similarly abated, thereby reducing still further the psychic
pressure on both sides to hold fast to their beliefs as a way to protect
their identities. 142
We don’t know whether it is possible to implement “expressive
overdetermination” in the context of self-defense cases, but we can
think of a related discourse strategy that might have similar effects in
dissipating conditions of identity threat in this domain. It’s what Cass
Sunstein calls “political charity”:
Three practices seem to constitute political charity. First, those who display political charity do not question the motives of those with whom
they disagree. On the contrary, they cast those motives in the best possible light. . . . Second, those who display political charity try to endorse the
deepest moral commitments of those with whom they disagree. If they
cannot endorse those commitments, at least they show respect for
them. . . . Third, those who display political charity try for reforms and
innovations that can be accepted by people who reject or even abhor
what they take (fear?) to be the defining commitments of the reformers
and innovators. 143

What we would propose is that those engaged in public discussion of controversial self-defense cases—in particular, those who, like
legal commentators, play a highly visible and influential role in
them—follow these principles. In particular, they should refrain from
the contemptuous attacks on one another’s motives and intelligence
that now dominate the Abuse Excuse/New Normativist debate.
These commentators are in a position to see—we’ve shown them—
142 See id. at 1097-98.
143 Cass Sunstein, Political Charity, The New Republic Open University (Nov. 19,
2006), http://www.tnr.com/blog/openuniversity?week=2006-11-13.
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that in fact they are wrong in their interpretations of the source of political conflict surrounding self-defense cases. It is not the case that
jurors and judges who afford defenses to battered women, or the citizens who support doing so, are “forsaking objective law” to indulge
“politically correct” sympathies for “some disadvantaged [group]”; 144
it’s not the case that the Abuse Excuse Critics are “hypocri[tically]”
indulging their “conservative” ideologies when they exempt from
their critique defenses for “true men” and enraged cuckolds. Rather,
commentators on both sides, and more importantly the citizens who
share their understandings of what the results should be in politically
controversial cases, are honestly appraising the facts, albeit in a manner shaped by self-defensive cognition. To show respect for one another, commentators on both sides should recognize the good faith of
their interlocutors, and also acknowledge that any distorting impact selfdefensive cognition exerts on their opponents’ perceptions of the
facts also operates on their own.
Most important of all, both sides should stop calling for reforms
that assault their opponents’ defining commitments. Proposals to
abolish the “battered woman” defense, 145 or to implement one or
another transparently partisan conception of emotion-based defenses
in criminal law generally, 146 heighten the general sense of status conflict that pervades debate about controversial cases, and thus reinforce the disposition of citizens to form beliefs about those cases that
support their partisan worldviews.
There are two reasons why political charity might function as an
identity-affirmation analog in the public discussions of self-defense
cases. The first is the critical role that uncharitable discourse plays in
creating self-defensive cognition. Self-defensive cognition presupposes
a context: the denial of particular beliefs can threaten a person’s sense
of self only if some set of social influences have invested those beliefs
with meanings critical to that person’s identity. The primary social
144 Wilson, supra note 32, at 111, 112.
145 See id.; Dershowitz, supra note 32
146 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in Critical Amer-

ica 63 (S. Bandes ed., 1999); Kelman, supra note 1, at 186-88 (proposing that selfdefense doctrine reflect “error cost” associated with result that denigrates egalitarian values); Sunstein, supra note 47, at 197-98 (“anticaste principle” should guide
outcomes in cases in which “error costs” include entrenchment of racial or gender
hierarchy); Lee, supra note 37, at 226-59.
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influence of this sort in the setting of controversial self-defense cases,
we believe, is conspicuous and conspicuously recriminatory public
debate. When a person see others whose values she shares, whose
credibility she accepts, and whose good opinion she covets denouncing or defending a particular decision, that’s a strong cue that the beliefs on which that assessment rest are ones integral to her defining
commitments. A person is all the more likely to form that impression
if she can see that those who hold her values are advancing that position in response to contrary arguments of persons whose fundamental values they reject. If those on both sides are attacking the character
of the other for holding the position they do, then participants will
naturally perceive that what’s at stake in the debate is the competence
and status of their defining group.
A discourse of political charity can reverse these dynamics. To
begin, it lowers the stakes: when each side acknowledges that the
other has formed an honest and good faith view of the facts, neither
has reason to perceive that the debate is judging the character of its
members. In that climate, moreover, individuals might well approach
controversial cases with a more open mind. When they see that those
whose values they share acknowledge that persons of good faith can
disagree, individuals will feel less anxiety that adopting any particular
position will estrange them from their peers. Some for that reason will
likely acknowledge publicly that they have formed factual beliefs different from the ones predominant within their group. And their willingness to do that will itself move other members of their group to
infer that those beliefs aren’t in fact essential to the identity of persons
of their cultural or ideological persuasion.
Obviously, political charity can have these effects only if it is
practiced. In addition, it would be an obvious mistake to assume that
political charity will be practiced just because it can be expected to
have a beneficial impact. For political charity to be regarded as a
meaningful response to the problem of self-defensive cognition,
there has to be reason to think a discourse norm of this sort can be
propagated in an effective way.
The strategically central position of those whom we are urging
to propagate it—legal commentators—is the second reason to think
that political charity might generate an identity-affirmation effect in
public debate over self-defense cases. Legal commentators play a
critical role in shaping public understandings of high-profile self-
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defense cases. Indeed, through formulation of the abuse excuse critique and the New Normative response to it, they have materially
contributed to the widespread public misperception that such cases
are being decided in an objectionably partisan way. They are thus in a
position now to correct that misunderstanding. If commentators, particularly ones who hold elite credentials, stop accusing decisionmakers, members of the public, and one another of bad faith, and instead
help members of the public to understand that such cases involve
honest, good-faith disagreements about the facts, their behavior can
itself be expected to have a significant impact in dissipating the anxiety that feeds self-defensive cognition.

IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have pursued three objectives. First, we have
sought to explain recurring, high-profile political conflict over selfdefense cases. Contrary to the prevailing view among commentators,
decisionmakers in such cases (and members of the public who react
to what decisionmakers do) are not willfully overriding their perception of doctrinally relevant facts to satisfy their partisan values.
Rather, consistent with the dynamic of self-defensive cognition, they
are subconsciously relying on their values to determine what the facts
are. Confronted with factual disputes, individuals are motivated to
adopt (and to persist in) the beliefs that cohere best with their defining cultural and ideological commitments, both to avoid a form of
dissonance and to protect their connection to others who share values. We presented evidence, in the form of an original empirical
study, to show that this is exactly what happens when individuals encounter prototypically controversial self-defense cases. Indeed, what
makes such cases controversial consists precisely in interaction of the
factual claims they present and competing cultural norms. As a result
of self-defensive cognition in this context, individuals of diverse persuasions end up culturally polarized in their judgments of the correct
outcomes in these cases notwithstanding their honest, good-faith effort
to decide based on an impartial application of the facts.
Second, we have offered an appraisal of this phenomenon. The
impact of self-defensive cognition, we’ve argued, doesn’t imply that
there isn’t a problem in public reactions to self-defense cases; it suggests only that the problem is different from what it is normally
thought to be. It is in fact a relief, we agree, to learn that members of
the public are trying to decide controversial cases impartially and not
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simply picking outcomes based on their ideological affinity to the defendants and victims. Nevertheless, we think it would be disappointing
to members of the public were they to learn that the factual perceptions they are forming in good faith are nevertheless subconsciously
influenced by those very affinities. There may be many debates (on
the effects of gun control, say, or on the acceptability of certain types
of environmental risks) in which individuals will happily embrace factual judgments that, in the face of uncertainty, enable them to express
their conception of the virtuous life and the just society. But in this
context, we think, the cognitive impact of such values on factual perceptions defeats a commitment that most individuals would have to
making a basic civic entitlement—the right to protect oneself from
unjustified violence and to be protected from the same—available
equally to all citizens regardless of their cultural outlooks and persuasions. We view the self-defensive cognition of self-defense as an instance of a distinctive sort of cognitive bias—cognitive illiberalism—
that defeats individuals’ desire to judge fellow citizens in a manner
respectful of their moral autonomy, and that injects certain identifiable pathologies into the politics of a society that aspires to the same.
Third, we have endeavored to identify at least a partial solution
to the problem of self-defensive cognition of self-defense. It is the
practice of political charity—a form of discourse characterized simultaneously by respect for one’s adversaries and humility about one’s
own powers of judgment—among legal commentators.
In our opinion, the impact of self-defensive cognition in the
creation of political conflict over self-defense cases is itself at least in
part an artifact of what legal commentators have been arguing in recent decades. Abuse Excuse Critics and their New Normativists detractors have relentlessly insisted that the positions of their opponents on cases like those of the battered woman the beleaguered
commuter are grounded in unacknowledged political partisanship.
Their arguments contribute to a climate in which individuals form the
impression that beliefs about the facts in such cases do in fact cohere
with membership in particular ideologically and culturally defined
groups. That impression in turn fuels the defensive impulse to form
and advance beliefs characteristic of one’s group, both to protect
one’s membership in it and to resist the implicit claim that one and
one’s peers are dishonest or deluded.
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Commentators are now in a position to reverse this process. If
they acknowledge that good-faith disagreements of fact are possible
here, if they acknowledge that their own perceptions are vulnerable to
distortion, they can help to mute the cues that induce persons subconsciously to equate changing their minds is akin with betraying
their defining commitments.
Of course, there’s no guarantee that a discourse of political charity among commentators will work. But in a condition of uncertainty,
proceeding as if it could would itself express the commitment of such
individuals to trying to use their special position in public deliberations in a manner that is politically constructive. 147 What’s more, because the best evidence that can now be assembled suggests it simply
isn’t the case that most members of the public are putting their partisan values ahead of their obligation to judge putative instances of violent self-defense in an impartial way, it would just be wrong, morally,
for commentators (especially ones who, without the benefit of such
evidence, have taken a contrary position in the past) to persist in asserting otherwise.

147 Cf. Kelman, supra note 1, at 177, 187; Sunstein, supra note 47, at 197.
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APPENDIX A. STUDY VIGNETTES
Battered Woman
We’d like to know how you would decide issues raised in a controversial criminal
trial. We would like to know what you would decide if you were on the jury in
that trial. First, please read the following summary of the facts and evidence:
Julie is charged with murdering her husband, William, whom she
shot in the head as he slept.
William had persistently abused Julie during their ten-year marriage. This mistreatment included physical beatings, some of which
resulted in injuries (facial cuts; broken ribs; twice a broken nose) requiring emergency medical treatment. Three times the police arrested
William for assaulting Julie, but released him from custody each time
after Julie declined to press charges.
Testifying in her own defense, Julie told the jury that William
had beaten her on the morning of the shooting after returning home
from a night of hard drinking and then fallen asleep in the bedroom.
Julie testified that she then went to her mother’s nearby home and
obtained the hand gun used in the shooting. “I felt I had no choice
except to shoot him,” she stated, “because I knew when he woke up
this time he was going to hurt me really bad.”
The defense also called an expert witness: Dr. Leonard Wallace,
a Ph.D. psychiatrist on the faculty of a major university. Based on a
through psychiatric examination of Julie, Wallace offered his opinion
that Julie was suffering from “battered woman syndrome.” “Like
other victims of chronic domestic violence,” Wallace testified, “Julie
believed that she was powerless to leave and that no one could or
would help her.” “In my opinion, Julie honestly perceived that her
husband would attack her if she didn’t kill him first; that belief was
quite reasonable, given the beatings she had previously suffered, and
the effect of those beatings on her psyche,” he concluded.
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Beleaguered Commuter
We’d like to know how you would decide issues raised in a controversial criminal
trial. We would like to know what you would decide if you were on the jury in
that trial. First, please read the following summary of the facts and evidence:
George is charged with murdering Alvin.
George (a 48-year old white male; 5' 7", 142 lbs.) fatally shot Alvin (a 17-year old African American male; 6' 2", 215 lbs.) after Alvin
stated "give me some money, man." The shooting occurred on a city
subway platform at 5:30 p.m. on a weekday evening. After shooting
Alvin, George fled but turned himself into police three hours later.
George had been mugged on three previous occasions. On one
of these, he had been beaten and required fifteen stitches under his
eye. George had reported the robberies, each of which had been
committed by persons George described as “teen aged, African
American males,” but police failed to make any arrests. George
bought the handgun used in the shooting after the third mugging.
Testifying in his own defense, George told the jury that, although he’d never seen Alvin before, George “could tell from his
body language and the aggressive tone of his voice” that Alvin was
“going to mess with me.” “It was exactly like the other time I had
been attacked,” George stated. “I felt I had no choice but to shoot
him,” George said, “because I knew if I didn’t he was going to hurt
me real bad.” Alvin had a pocket knife on his person, but had not
displayed it before being shot.
The defense also called an expert witness: Dr. Leonard Wallace,
a Ph.D. psychiatrist on the faculty of a major university. Based on a
through psychiatric examination of George, Wallace offered his opinion that George was suffering from “post-traumatic stress syndrome.” “Like many victims of repeated violent beatings,” Wallace
testified, “George lived in constant fear of additional attacks.” “In my
opinion, George honestly perceived that Alvin would attack him if he
didn’t kill him first; that belief was quite reasonable, given the muggings George had previously suffered, and the effect of those muggings on his psyche,” Wallace concluded.

